Recent developments in Indonesia
Devolution of power to the regions and the role of the military

By Carmel Budiardjo
Director of TAPOL (The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign)

Indonesia is a vast archipelagic country composed of numerous ethnic groups, large and small, with a population of around 220 million people. The territory was brought together over centuries of conquest to become the Dutch East Indies, and was inherited after the end of the Pacific War by the Indonesian Republic which was formally recognised in December 1949. The centrally-placed island of Java has always been the centre of power and heartland of the Republic and is far more densely populated than the so-called 'outer islands', a term I prefer to avoid using because it seems to relegate the rest of the country to being to appendages of the Javanese heartland.

In the eyes of successive political elites since 1949, a unitary state has always been the ideal. The idea of forming a federated state which would surely, on reflection, be the most appropriate system of governance for such a vast and diverse country, has always been spurned. The country's third president, Abdurrachman Wahid, once remarked that 'federation has become a dirty word'. The explanation, as he rightly said, was because it was too closely associated with the Dutch stratagem of creating puppet regional states, as they tried to maintain control of Indonesia during the years of Indonesia's revolutionary struggle from 1945 to 1949. But that is only part of the story. The problem is that the country's political elite and the armed forces do not want to relinquish control of the vast territories beyond the centre.

At the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, the Republic of the United States of Indonesia was formed, known as RIS in Indonesian. But within weeks, RIS was swept away, to be replaced by a unitary Republic of Indonesia with a provisional constitution that remained in force until President Sukarno dissolved the Constituent Assembly before allowing it to complete its deliberations, and issued his decree on 5 July 1959, re-instating the 1945 Constitution, based firmly on unitary principles, and giving almost unlimited powers to the president.

During the years of the Suharto dictatorship, the 1945 Constitution became sacrosanct and centralisation was a central plank of the regime. Control from the heartland was brutally reinforced by the army's presence throughout the country through the network of regional and local military commands that existed (and still exist) alongside regional and local administrations. It was further reinforced by the enactment of a number of laws, in particular the 1974 Law on Regional Governance and the Village Governance Law of 1979 which together brought the vast administrative empire under Jakarta's control and imposed on all villages a single, uniform administrative system and established top-down processes to control the appointment of regional, local and village heads. The effect of the latter law was to destroy customary decision-making bodies at the village level, which formed a vital part of traditional life in many areas. The undermining of these traditional structures is to a large extent responsible for the difficulties there have been in resolving conflicts that have taken so many lives in Maluku and in Poso, Central Sulawesi in the past few years.

In the post-Suharto period, one of the earliest reforms was the enactment of Law 22/1999 on Regional Autonomy which abolished Suharto's two laws on regional administration and devolved many powers to the regions. It is noteworthy that this law and its accompanying Law 25/1999 on the Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regions, was drafted and enacted under B.J. Habibie, who hails from South Sulawesi, the only non-Javanese of the country's five presidents. However, these laws devolved powers not to the 26 provinces but to the more than four hundred districts and scores of municipalities, a move widely believed to be aimed at discouraging secessionist sentiments. The law devolved licensing authority in many sectors, including mining, industry, forestry, agriculture, labour and trade to the regions.

The overwhelming vote in favour of independence in East Timor in August 1999 in a ballot conducted by the United Nations, was a profound blow to most Indonesians and in particular to the Indonesian armed forces, who took revenge by destroying some 80 percent of the country's infrastructure and driving more than 250,000 East Timorese across the border to West Timor. Inevitably, East Timor's decision to reject the special autonomy law on offer from Jakarta and to become an independent state, intensified fears of disintegration among Indonesia's ruling elite and in particular in the armed forces. It led to a new determination to hold the country together, come what may.

There are two conflicting views about the autonomy law's likely impact on the dreaded prospect of disintegration. Some argue that devolution is critically important in order to hold the country together by responding to the many grievances in the regions about their lack of control over their own resources and giving them the chance to run local government in a way that is more in tune with local communities and traditions, while others fear that by devolving powers, the law will only increase the likelihood of regions deciding to leave the Republic. The Megawati government clearly holds the latter view, as is evident from its determination to carry out a major revision of the law, in the face of widespread opposition. I would argue that by lessening central control and giving local people and communities a far greater say in their lives, the pressures to secede, insofar as they exist, would be significantly reduced.

Implementation of the Regional Autonomy Law officially began on 1 January 2001 by which time Abdurrachman Wahid was president. However, five months earlier, in August 2000, the Minister for Administrative Reform in Wahid's cabinet, Professor Ryaas Rasyid, who was primarily responsible for drafting the laws, resigned from the Wahid cabinet in protest because his department had been stripped of responsibility for implementing the laws at a time when he was busily engaged in preparing nearly one hundred implementary regulations. His intention had been to place devolution under the control of an independent regional autonomy board but he was overruled by the president. He rightly saw this as a setback for the proper implementation of autonomy. Professor Rasyid has been one of the most outspoken critics of moves to revise the law which commenced soon after Wahid was impeached and replaced by his vice-president, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Responsibility for implementing the laws was instead handed over to the Interior Ministry, always one of the most heavily militarised departments, where military support for the unitary state finds strong support.

After Wahid was removed from office in July 2001, the man appointed Minister of the Interior was (and still is) Lt General Hari Sabarno, who for years headed the armed forces group in parliament, after a tour of duty as commander of the East Java military command. One of the first statements he made after taking office was to announce that he would start preparing for a revision of the Regional Autonomy Law.

While she was still vice-president, Megawati Sukarnoputri who has always enjoyed the backing of the armed forces, expressed her misgivings about the Law on Regional Autonomy. She said that the regional autonomy law violated the principle of Indonesia being a unitary state as laid down in the 1945 Constitution, and devolved too many powers to the regions. Such fears have given birth to the acronym NKRI or Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia), an ideologically inspired formula giving primacy to the Republic's unitary construction.

As soon as it was announced that plans to revise the autonomy law were underway, a fierce debate erupted, with strong opposition coming from regional officials and politicians who see the move as an attempt by the central government to snatch back their powers. People in the regions have stood by helpless for years as Jakarta plundered their wealth and gave little back in return, or imposing forms of government that are not in tune with local traditions. For resource-rich provinces like Riau and East Kalimantan, the question of gaining greater control over the wealth which their natural resources produce is of crucial importance. Riau, for instance, currently receives annually 1.4 trillion rupiahs, the equivalent of $132 million, from Jakarta as compared with the38 trillion rupiahs which goes to the national coffers from its oil reserves. Not surprisingly, Riau has been one region where calls for independence have been voiced. For the two resource-rich provinces, Aceh and West Papua, the dispute with Jakarta is about far more than gaining more control of proceeds from their resources . It is primarily about the question of their right to decide on their political status by means of a referendum. The conflict situation in these two territories, where military brutality has been so widespread over many years, persuaded Jakarta to offer them 'special autonomy', in each case with a much larger share of the proceeds, in the hope that this would quell the mounting demands for a referendum, for there can be no doubt that a referendum in either place would almost certainly result in a vote to secede from the Republic.

Opposition to revision of the autonomy law intensified when it became known that the revision includes an article that gives the president the power to dissolve a local legislative assembly, if there is a no-confidence vote supported by one-third of the voters, thus allowing the assembly to be disbanded by minority vote, a very strange system indeed. This aims a direct blow at the whole principle local democracy based on the principle of free and fair elections and will place democratically-elected assemblies at the mercy of the whim of the central government. While the government has argued that there are flaws in the law and talk about confusion over 'multiple interpretations' of its provisions, in other words, technocratic considerations, the government's critics believe that there is a more sinister aim behind the plans, namely to restore much of the centre's power over the regions.

Advocates of devolution are well aware that there are many flaws in the autonomy law, in particular because implementation was commenced before the many implementary regulations were in place to sort out the division of authority between central and local government and before anything had been done to properly inform local officials, civil servants and the general public about the workings of the new law. But they argue that it is far too soon to revise the law, and that much more time should be given to allow the law to operate.

When the interior department was unexpectedly given control over implementation of the law in August 2000, only one set of regulations had been drafted and fifteen others were being hastily cobbled together, as the date for implementation drew near.

One huge benefit of the law as it now stands is that it will ensure that the principle of local democracy can take effect, in place of the top-down system which became so overwhelming during the Suharto years, in which all authority is held by officials appointed from above. The law abolishes the hierarchical relations between central government, the districts and municipalities. Local government heads will be elected by elected regional assemblies and will be accountable to these bodies rather than to higher-level government bodies. While provincial governors still continue to represent the central government, district chiefs and mayors are accountable to the local assembly and hence to the local electorate.

President Megawati made the government's intentions clear when she told a meeting of governors, regents and city mayors in January this year that the law needed to be revised because of problems 'related to our statehood and our nationhood.' She said it was necessary to strengthen national unity and the integrity of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia and also used the occasion to try to stifle discussion, telling local officials that they should take care to 'avoid debate' and to refrain from issuing statements on issues that they do not understand, hardly the kind of language one would expect to hear in a healthily functioning democracy. [Jakarta Post, 29 January 2002] Earlier, the interior minister had insisted that despite the many objections to any revision, the government would continue with its plan, even making it clear that local administrations would not be involved in the drafting the revision legislation, 'in their own interests'. [Jakarta Post, 29 October 2001]

The main obstacle to local democracy in Indonesia is the continued existence of the army's network of territorial commands, the so-called kodams, korems, and kodims that remain in place in every nook and cranny of the Republic. Following the downfall of Suharto in May 1998, the armed forces were very much on the defensive. Now at last, after more than three decades of being Suharto's tool of repression, the military were being confronted by many protests about their many crimes against humanity, and their image was seriously tarnished. In the latter months of 1998, Aceh for instance was awash with gruesome accounts of the grave human rights violations that had occurred during the nightmare years of DOM - daerah operasi militer - or military operations zone, from 1989 to 1998. Thousands of people had died, thousands of women were widows and children were orphaned. A special investigation team was sent to Aceh and collected numerous accounts of grave violations. There was even the spectacle on television of senior military officers being questioned by members of parliament about these terrible events. The abduction of dozens of activists in the final months of the Suharto era led to a trial of the officers from Kopassus, the army's special combat corps, involved and a high-profile general, Lt General Prabowo, was dismissed from the army, albeit 'honorably', for his role in these abductions.

At the beginning of 2000, a report by a special commission of inquiry into the massive human rights violations in East Timor was published which led to the suspension, then dismissal of General Wiranto from Wahid's cabinet and it seemed that ABRI - soon to be renamed TNI - was gravely discredited. Wiranto had been named in the report as the man who was responsible for those terrible events. For a brief period, reformasi, the clarion call of the student masses whose demonstrations had forced Suharto from power, appeared to be echoed within the armed forces and a group of officers made it known that the reforms being contemplated would include the dismantling of territorial commands from the sub-district level down. But by the latter part of Wahid's presidency, the military were back on track and far from downsizing the territorial command structure, it was about to be increased. A new territorial command was set up in Maluku, and another most recently in Aceh, with others being readied in Kalimantan.

It was Lt General Ryamizard Ryacudu, commander of Kostrad, the army's strategic command which is now taking the lead in fighting armed GAM units in Aceh, who said very recently: 'Like it or not, the glue of the nation nowadays is the TNI. If people want to dismantle the state, go ahead and abolish the territorial units. If the Trikora military command in Irian Jaya were dissolved, Irian Jaya would be independent tomorrow.' [Tempo, 7 April 2002.] You can't put it more bluntly than this. It would appear to be the case that the TNI considers that the need to hold the country together, to protect NKRI, the unitary state, is the justification for its existence. This ties in closely with Megawati's working programme: 'To defend the unification and unity of the nation in the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.' This also shows why the government is so concerned to hold back the push towards devolution and ensure that the central government can rein in local governments when necessary.

In the cases of Aceh and West Papua, where there is a deep sense of alienation towards Jakarta because of the years of repression and massive human rights violations, the government has found the need to grant these territories a special form of autonomy, hoping thereby to quell growing resentment towards Jakarta which is now expressing itself, in the case of Aceh, in calls for a referendum, and in West Papua, in calls for dialogue about the territory's future and about the way it was incorporated into the Republic by means of a fraudulent act of self-determination, misleadingly called the 'Act of Free Choice'. In both territories, there is also deep resentment at the total lack of accountability for the countless human rights violations that have been committed with impunity over many years. Yet, calls for justice have been ignored. This is despite the fact that parliament has adopted a law on human rights and a law on human rights courts that make it possible to set up ad hoc courts to hear cases of past crimes against humanity, putting aside the principle of non-retroactivity.

In both places, tens of thousands of troops have been deployed. A member of our staff visited Aceh a month ago and reported that it can only be described as a war zone, with troops patrolling the streets of the capital, tanks and armoured personnel carriers very much evident on the streets along with the rest of the traffic and road blocks, manned either by soldiers or police along all the main roads. This is what Lt General Ryacudu calls the 'glue' holding the country together.

Jakarta has made considerable efforts to win support from the international community for its policy of total dedication to maintaining the unitary state, its so-called 'territorial integrity'. The latest move in this direction was a visit last week by security minister, General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to Stockholm for the express purpose of getting the Swedish government's support for special autonomy in Aceh and even suggesting they might try to convince the GAM leadership in Sweden to accept special autonomy.. The Swedish government dutifully issued a statement supporting Indonesia's 'territorial integrity' but this is hardly likely to change the mind either of GAM or of the Acehnese people, the majority of whom have little interest in special autonomy.

Government leaders - the UK, the US and Australia - have been queuing up to express support for special autonomy in Aceh and West Papua without paying any heed either to the opinions of the inhabitants of these territories or acknowledging the fact that special autonomy is basically the cover for a campaign of violence and repression by the Indonesian armed forces. Governments may think this is justified as a way to prevent the disintegration of the Indonesian Republic but why are the Acehnese and West Papuans being expecting to pay such a high price in lives to maintain Indonesia's 'territorial integrity'? By turning a blind eye to what is happening on the ground in these two territories, the se governments are only allowing a war in Aceh to fester on, regardless of the tremendous loss of life. And they are refusing to acknowledge the legitimate demands of the West Papuan people for a thoroughgoing review of the fraudulent Act of 'Free'- ie No - Choice in 1969.

Last month, the international solidarity movement for West Papua launched a campaign calling on Kofi Annan to conduct a review of the UN's role in allowing the fraudulent Act of Free Choice to go ahead. The UN's role had been to 'advise and assist' those conducting the Act. The Act had no relation whatever to the UN's own clearly defined principles for conducting an act of self-determination and the events of 1969 represent a grave stain on the international organisation's reputation. We hope that the European Parliament will consider this matter by supporting this campaign to persuade the UN to act courageously and try to rectify this most serious betrayal of its own principles which consigned the people of West Papua to more than three decades of brutality, repression and the theft of their resources.

Thank you.