Abbreviation:
GOI : Government of Indonesia
NAD-G : Nangroe Aceh Darussalam Government (Name given for Aceh Province under Special Autonomy Law)
GAM : Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Aceh Liberation Movement)
TNI : Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army)
AL : Autonomy Law

After a long debate at both national and local levels, repeated revisions of concepts, finally President Megawati signed Special Autonomy law as part of conflict resolution for Aceh which took effect in February this year (2002) amid debates among Acehnese, elites, grassroot, and GAM whether or not the law could guarantee peace in the region, or instead, it will promote new violent, ignite new conflict, fertilize the existing protracted civil war, and drive the warring parties to sustain conflict. The law itself is a combination of Aceh Parliament and Jakarta concepts, where during the composition of the law, civil society as important elements and agent of change in Aceh were excluded. The GOI claimed that the law has been discussed with all necessary entities both in Jakarta and Aceh before it was implemented. They did discuss it with civil society groups in Aceh but merely with those defined by Jakarta. This unilateral decision on what is good for Aceh (according to the GOI), is totally rejected by Aceh Liberation Movement.

The law grants better access to economy and politic for the region in addition to Shari'a Law. However, there are some fundamental problems that seriously inhibit the NAD-G in implementing the law.

1. Autonomy law, Development, and War Economy.

1.1 Could the AL accommodate various grievances in Aceh? Could the economic agenda in AL accommodate the entire population of Aceh? There are GAM, victims, conflict affected community, and unidentified groups who are taking advantages amid protracted conflict.

1.2 GAM seeks independence. It is likely that the negotiation could accommodate them through political approach such as local election or power sharing, where GAM could establish a political party to democratically achieve their ultimate objective.

1.3 There are victims who are seeking justice from the GOI. They expect the government to sincerely prosecute those committed human rights abuse in Aceh. The AL does not explain this matter, which will lead this group to continuously seek justice through revenge, or retaliation by killing TNI, Police, or those who collaborate with them (civilians).

1.4 Affected community seeks justice, economic compensation, development, and betterment of life. In Aceh justice system (courts) are not functioning properly, and also the Kecamatan administrations are mostly paralyzed. Most government offices at this level were burned, looted, and some are occupied by military or police Brimob. How can the local government convince the people of Aceh that law is being implemented while the system is not functioning also how can the government guarantee their programs reach the beneficiaries while the office administration system to channel the government program is not working properly.

1.5 To secure the projects, NAD-G will need to use TNI/Police in the area controlled by GAM. They will use military power to secure the reconstruction/development projects, or to deliver other forms of assistance, but it will only feed conflict and does not guarantee sustainability. Some budget must be allocated for security reasons, and therefore, it will only spoil military and advantage them both economically and politically, and as a consequence they have adequate reasons to sustain their position and conflict in Aceh.

1.6 With more velocity of money in Aceh due to special AL but non-transparent corrupt and weak government at all levels in Aceh, it is obvious the NAD-G will be unable to properly manage the flow of money, and therefore, as shown in other conflicts, the law will only feed existing conflict and create mistrust.

1.7 Previous experience showed that the TNI was eager to involve in development or recovery projects, for example 'flood recovery programs'. The TNI could use their power to force NAD-G through their 'Bhakti TNI' program with the reason is that the area is not safe for the GOI to implement projects. Question: How can the AL empower local capacity, local skills, and local work force to rebuild Aceh peacefully through promoting participation and creating sense of belonging? The TNI will most likely force local community for free labor to work with them, as a consequence, this is potential to spread more hatred between civilian and military/state and eventually it will breed more violence. (DOM experience). The 'Bhakti TNI' program is another means how the TNI squeeze Aceh money to fund their operation and maintain their territorial functions in order to control all civilian movements.

1.8 Clear and unclear areas. The projects could be prioritized in the so-called 'clear area' and ignore 'unclear area'. This will create discrimination and hatred among the communities that will lead horizontal conflict between Acehnese and NAD government. GAM could claim the people in 'clear areas' as government supporters, but people living in 'unclear areas' will be accused of supporting GAM. The dilemma will then create horizontal conflict between those seen as opposing GAM and supporting GAM. So how can the project implementation to continue unless the NAD government collaborates with NGOs, while the fact that NGOs in Aceh are viewed as Freedom Movement supporters. The NAD-G and military hesitate to build cooperation with them, or instead they will establish 'government-led NGOs'.

1.9 The GOI and NAD government appear to be not serious in implementing the law. It seems that they are only thinking how to maintain their political positions and gain as many economic and political opportunities through the camouflage of AL. For instance, now under the approval of Jakarta, NAD-G are establishing several new districts (Kabupaten) in order for current ruling regime to be able to maintain their position and build alliance if future local election to be held. The establishment of new districts is a clear indication to allow more space for military to intervene at lowest government administration as possible as new military and Police headquarters need to be installed. How can we expect more space for civilian communities to freely express their political and economic rights if they have to compete with military interests?

1.10. Recently, Kanun (NAD law) was composed with the exclusion of civil society in Aceh. It was made by the parliament that some of whom are not even representative as general election in Aceh was not taking place properly. If the Kanun is made for the benefit of the people of Aceh, why were they not invited to contribute? Their aspirations need to be heard, as the law itself will then be implemented to the people of Aceh. Is there any guarantee that the Kanun could promote participation, appreciation, and peace? As civil societies in Aceh were excluded in the process, the Kanun is potential to be ignored by the people of Aceh. If this happen, I am afraid the military and police will again force people to follow the rules without questions or through dictatorial manners. Obviously, it will again cause new violence, this time not with the central government but with local government, local parliament and even worse among the Acehnese themselves who are for and against the law. It seems to me that the application of AL in Aceh is solely to follow Jakarta instruction rather than to allow local initiatives to proceed how they want to fashion or shape Aceh in the future. Obviously, this is another form of Jakarta's role to dictate people of Aceh, regardless the AL.

2. Autonomy Law and People's Political Rights.

Politic is another essential agenda in the AL-NAD. One of the essential articles is the opportunity for the Acehnese to carry out local election, by which we can elect governor directly, fully participate in democracy and political affairs. However, with dominant presence of military and Police paramilitary Brimob, and the establishment of KODAM in Aceh, the freedom of democracy and political agenda in Aceh is hardly possible to forward peacefully. The military and possibly GAM could intervene in domestic politic over civilian roles. The reasons are based on the following facts and questions:

2.1. Will GAM ever wholeheartedly agree with AL to engage in local politic, which is clearly supervised and led by Jakarta through its military power in Aceh? Can the dialogue lead GAM to accept this offer, lay down their weapon and struggle through political means?

2.2. In one of peace agreements, GAM agreed to engage through non-violent measures to achieve their political objectives. However, the GOI did not seem to allow GAM to freely engage in political affairs in Aceh, let alone to establish its political party.

2.3. How can GAM and GOI allow other groups in Aceh to establish political party in local election, while GAM claims that they are representing the people of Aceh, but some groups claims that they also have rights to participate. The AL does not clearly explain what local election means. Will Jakarta allow the people of Aceh to establish political parties an engage in local election without Jakarta intervention?

2.4. The people of Aceh are not fully aware of their political rights and, therefore, it is potential that their rights can be manipulated. There are a number of intellectuals, activists, and academia who are fully aware of political issues, but they are risking their life if they are seen as opposing one side or the other. Two critical professors, human rights defenders, NGO workers, and a member of Monitoring Team of Security Modalities in Humanitarian Pause, were killed in Aceh.

3. People participation.

The absence of civil society participation in political process is an obvious indication that power is dominated by an oppressive regime. This sort of nation is characterized by widespread of insecurity and is likely to create the climate of distrust and suspicion. On the contrary, a strong civil society can cement a societal fabric that can support civil conflict resolution. The civil society groups in Aceh encompass all elements of active citizenship reaching from local level across the middle level to top level such as in government representatives. Such groups are all societal sectors including businessman, trade unions, journalists, scientists, ulamas, peace and human right activists, women's associations, farmers, and fishermen.

In order to create sustainable peace, the transition process needs to enjoy the support of the entire population and not only the political elites. It is critical to mobilize people at grassroot level, people living in rural areas by giving them the opportunity to participate in their own affairs freely at the lowest level possible. Participation strengthens civil society and the economy through the empowerment of individuals, communities, and organizations.

However, the traumatized population in Aceh, the victims, the marginalized, the abandoned, the uneducated, the one who live under threat and pressure will not be able to perform themselves to democratically participate and express their opinions. As long as the military and Police paramilitary still take control of the region over civil government, the people of Aceh still face major obstacles in participation, fair and open politic.

4. Military and peacebuilding.

4.1. The installation of Kodam is another major obstacle for peacebuilding in Aceh. The TNI will keep maintaining their function under national integrity doctrine through their territorial operations. Top brass officers in Jakarta and recently Chief of Staff of Iskandar Muda Military HQ repeatedly announced that dialogue is not related to military operation. The Inpres No 1/2002 is a strong backup to carry out their agenda in Aceh. On the other hand, Pangkolaops is another Jakarta based TNI structure in Aceh, which is contradictory to the spirit of Autonomy Law that allows local government to take their responsibility of internal security matters, as announced by president Megawati.

4.2. President Megawati has officially announced that security recovery in Aceh is the responsibility of local government, as part of devolution of power through Autonomy law. This policy will also affect financial arrangement of NAD-G. Certain percentage of budget will go to support military operation in Aceh.

4.3. A year ago, a controversial statement made by a top military official that for Aceh, 'Security first' and 'Development' later.

4.4. Continuous demand for 'peace' in Aceh in translated differently by the GOI/TNI. For them, 'Peace' means sending more military in order to provide better security in the province, but the people of Aceh interpret 'Peace' as no violence, free from military operation, no killing, proper law enforcement, betterment of economy, development, better education, freedom of expression, participation, and civil supremacy.

5. Dialog and positive peace for Aceh.

5.1. The GOI needs continue to negotiate with GAM, but it is important to note that conflict does not belong to high levels only. It belongs to the people. The grassroot people who suffers, severely affected, and feel how conflict has affected their life socially, economically, psychologically, and politically. In this context it is very important that the government and GAM should be more inclusive in their pursuit of peace. Civil society should not be seen and treated as mere spectators in the peace process but are part and parcel of the peace process. The government and GAM are urged to be more inclusive in their pursuit of peace and to find ways to involve civil society in plans and actions that generate solidarity, reconciliation, and appreciation.

5.2. One of significant GAM-RI agreements is 'All inclusive dialogue or Democratic Consultation'. This is a window of opportunity to include all elements in Aceh to participate in finding peaceful resolution. However, the government translates it as the dialogue participated by the groups defined by the government through her provincial office under the management of the governor of Aceh, which has been a long debate with GAM during the negotiation process.

And the people of Aceh understand that 'All inclusive dialogue' is the democratic participation of all elements, formal and non-formal entities in Aceh and the diasporas in finding lasting comprehensive solution for Aceh. These differences have actually abandoned the implementation of peace agreement.

5.3. Dialogue and military operation are two contradictory formulas. Military operation must stop in order to allow space for negotiation and peace agreement implementation.

5.4. Previous peace agreements failed to implement in Aceh. It appears that serious negotiation to reach 'Full Cease Fire' is essential, with the presence of international monitors to ensure the success of implementation. I believe it will be very difficult to convince GOI for 'Cease Fire' and get them ready to harbor international monitors, but with international intervention especially European Community, we expect the government will accept the idea.

5.5. It seem that negotiation has been used by the GOI to politically promote their credibility to international community as if real peace process were going on in Aceh, therefore they could convince international community for economic and political benefits.

6. Conclusion and Recommendations.

6.1. For the Acehnese it is not only a question of having more humanitarian aids, development, economic equity, and military establishment, it is a question of achieving justice for the victims of the conflict and for those who committed the crime.

6.2. At national level, Megawati is struggling hard to defend her position as a president. In this case, she will need a strong support from the military; therefore, she will not condemn, prosecute, correct, and even advice military, their position and behavior in Aceh because it will imperil her position in 2004.

6.3. The European Community is highly expected to work hand in hand with HDC in Aceh to facilitate and mediate peace process through more practical measures, such as:

6.3.1. Strengthen local capacities for peace; support local NGOs

6.3.2. Create hope to the people of Aceh to stimulate people to disengage themselves from war.

6.3.3. Exchange experiences by promoting other international examples how peacemakers work in other conflict regions.

6.3.4. Get both sides to understand how conflict should peacefully be solved, they should learn from a number of successful and sustainable resolution. A comparative study for them is urgently required.

6.3.5. Multi-track diplomacy

6.3.6. Deep intervention in governance building, military and police reform

6.3.7. Frequently expose the suffering of Acehnese (human rights abuse, etc) internationally through coalition of NGOs, humanitarian, and development institutions in order to create awareness among international community.

6.4. Norway is well known for her experience in peacebuilding and conflict resolution. I see the possibility for Norway to involve in peace process in Aceh as they have successfully reached 'Cease-Fire Agreement' in Sri Lanka recently, and in other parts of the world.

6.5. The EC should set up an agenda how to get involved in mitigating political violence in Aceh either at international, national, or local levels. Get the GOI or NAD-G to learn from other successful conflict resolutions how armed conflict ended peacefully. If the GOI did not know how to prevent conflict, they should learn how to end it, therefore, more international advocacy, pressure, advice, or other conditional arrangements are required in order to provide better human security in Indonesia.