A brief history of the militarisation of the EU
Esko Seppänen 12.11.2002
The EEC was founded as a customs union. Member States had
common customs tariffs on imports from third countries. When
the EEC became the European Community (EC), it became even
more emphatically an economic community. Gradually a common
market was created where goods and services are not differentiated
according to their place of production.
In the beginning of the 1990s a treaty was concluded in
Maastricht in the Netherlands which turned the EC into the
European Union (EU).
Under the Maastricht Treaty, common foreign and security
policy (CFSP) became EU policy, but from the outset it was
the preserve of the Member States under the co-called second
pillar, i.e. it was not communauterised.
The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 put some meat on the
bones in the form of the current Article 17 (previously J
7):
"The common foreign and security policy shall include all
questions relating to the security of the Union, including
the progressive framing of a common defence policy, in accordance
with the second sub-paragraph, which might lead to a common
defence, should the European Council so decide. It shall in
that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such
a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional
requirements."
What does this mean?
It means that the EU’s foreign and security policy has acquired
a defence policy, which is not the same as defence
(which EU members of NATO regulate through NATO). It "might
lead to a common defence", and if it does the EU will become
a military alliance. But Member States would have to reach
a unanimous decision on this at a summit of EU leaders in
the European Council.
When flexibility is mentioned, it means that a military
alliance is being inserted into the EU’s structures: the treaties
and the lofty principles are elastic. In order for this flexibility
to be legal, the concept of constructive abstention
in decision-making has been entered into the treaties. This
means that a dissenting country gives other countries permission
to pursue their chosen course in the name of the EU. Enhanced
cooperation has also been toyed with, which grants a large
group of countries the right to form structures within the
EU to promote their common interests, for example common weapon
procurement projects.
According to the second sub-paragraph of Article 17, crisis
management tasks include "humanitarian and rescue tasks,
peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management,
including peace making ".
What does this mean?
It means that the EU is acquiring the ability to implement
the co-called Petersberg tasks, which were listed in
the sub-paragraph mentioned. These include peace-keeping but
also peace making, which is war. Since in this connection
the word defence is mentioned, it opens the door to the possibility
of attack.
Under the Amsterdam Treaty, the Council kept foreign and
security policy firmly in its own hands (i.e. in the hands
of the large Member States). Not one of the large countries,
which like to speak on behalf of the whole of Europe, appears
to be genuinely prepared to give up its own foreign policy.
They want to co-ordinate the EU’s foreign policy among themselves,
but without the smaller countries. To that end, it was decided
in Amsterdam to establish the office of the high representative
of EU foreign policy. Javier Solana, the secretary-general
of NATO and former social democratic foreign minister of Spain
(and a former peace activist), was appointed to the post.
Indications that the Member States want to keep second-pillar
activities out of the Commission’s power were reinforced when
Solana was also appointed secretary general of the Council
and secretary general of the soon-to-be defunct WEU.
It is the Member States and not the EU’s institutions which
decide on the EU’s crisis management operations. In this respect
the EU is not a federal state.
Matters developed rapidly at the Cologne summit.
The common foreign and security policy (CFSP) was replaced
by the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
By replacing the word "foreign policy" with the word "defence
policy" a new step was taken towards a stance of aggression,
but still the flags of war were only waved for crisis management.
EU leaders declared that "we intend to give the European Union
the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities
regarding a common European policy on security and defence".
"The Council should have the ability to take decisions on
the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management
tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the "Petersberg
tasks". To this end, the Union must have the capacity for
autonomous action backed up by credible military forces, the
means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in
order to respond to international crises without prejudice
to actions by NATO."
It was said for the first time that the EU’s actions should
be "in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter".
This has since become a catch phrase in the documents of every
summit, as has the refrain that the EU is not creating a Euroarmy.
In Cologne it was decided to start to "strengthen the industrial
and technological defence base", which was the first tentative
step towards an EU military complex. The desire was expressed
that EU troops should use weapons and weapons systems made
in the EU because the prevailing thinking is that a strong
arms industry provides a solid foundation for military operations
abroad.
Determination was expressed to "foster the restructuring
of the European defence industries amongst those States involved".
Historically speaking there has been no such willingness;
instead countries have carefully kept their military secrets
to themselves. This possibility is provided by Article 296
of the Treaty on European Union:
"No Member State shall be obliged to supply information
the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential
interests of its security.
Any Member State may take such measures as it considers
necessary for the protection of the essential interests of
its security which are connected with the production of or
trade in arms, munitions and war material."
It was decided in Cologne to integrate the WEU into the
EU’s structures. The EU absorbed from the WEU the security
research institute in France and the Torrejo satellite centre
in Spain.
Before it was run down, the WEU tested strategic crisis
management systems and NATO resource deployment in EU-led
operations in the CMX/CRISEX exercises from 17 to 23 February
2000. These were staff exercises where for the first time
WEU (i.e. EU) and NATO command systems were co-ordinated.
The manoeuvres were not conducted under the Partnership for
Peace (PFP), but rather it was for a select group. Finland
participated, but Russia, for example, did not.
At the same time NATO was holding its own staff exercises
– pursuant to Article 5. EU Member States outside of NATO
were not informed as to what the exercises were about.
The US is keeping a very close eye on what sort of military
decisions are being made in the EU. The Cologne conclusions
state that although crisis management is exclusively within
the EU’s remit, it should not conflict with NATO operations.
EU operations are fully compatible with those of NATO. The
EU cannot function without NATO’s strategic and command structures.
The Helsinki summit of December 1999 marked the decisive
launch of the militarisation of the EU in practice. It was
decided to create military institutions in the EU structures
and to equip common crisis management units: a Euroarmy.
EU leaders expressed their "determination to develop an autonomous
capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not
engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations
in response to international crises ".
EU-led crisis management operations are carried out "with
or without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities", but
at the same time "avoid unnecessary duplication" (with NATO
operations). Attention was also drawn to NATO’s Washington
decision, according to which non-EU members of NATO and other
interested countries may participate in EU crisis management.
NATO member countries committed themselves to using NATO’s
joint defence planning bodies to co-ordinate their actions,
and non-NATO countries were encouraged to act according to
the PARP process of the Partnership for Peace programme.
In Helsinki the Member States committed themselves to being
able to assemble by 2003 a military force of 50,000-60,000
within 60 days and to maintain it for a minimum of a year.
This force would be able to carry out all the Petersberg tasks,
and this goal is known as the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG).
Where did the figure of 50,000-60,000 come from?
EU Member States have around two million soldiers at arms.
Of these, however, only one tenth are trained and equipped
so that they can be used in international (crisis management)
tasks. Of these 200,000 qualified troops, only around 50,000
can be deployed at short notice. Thus the number of Eurotroops
available for crisis management tasks was dictated by the
total number of troops available.
In reality the Euroarmy is a force of 200,000 troops.
Since the Helsinki headline goal (HHG) states that troops
should be maintained in combat readiness for a year, back-up
and replacement troops are needed for less rapid deployment.
Since the assumption is that over a one-year period a brigade
is in the field, on maintenance duty and on stand-by for four
months at a time, the HHG requirement of a force of 50,000-60,000
troops in the field for a year actually entails an army of
200,000.
Apart from the EU’s crisis management tasks, Member States’
armies must also perform regional defence tasks to the extent
that these have been agreed in NATO. NATO countries in the
EU do this through NATO’s command structures, bypassing the
EU’s crisis management.
At the Helsinki summit it was again denied that a Euroarmy
was being created. The matter was not mentioned in the annexes
to the Helsinki summit, but at the last minute Finland mentioned
it – with the permission of the others – in the presidency
conclusions.
The crack troops of the EU’s crisis management are not a
Euroarmy in the sense that they mass in barracks in Member
States and not in joint Eurobarracks. But in all other senses
they are. Even Commission president Romano Prodi said out
loud that "when I spoke of a Euroarmy, I wasn’t joking. If
people don’t want to call it a Euroarmy, so be it. It could
also be called Margaret or Mary-Anne or by any other name,
but it is a common effort for peace-keeping duties."
In the Helsinki final document the Member States saw the
restructuring of the European defence industry as "strengthening
the European industrial and technological defence base".
In Helsinki it was decided to establish the following military
institutions within the EU: 1) The Political and Security
Committee, which deals with all ESDP-related issues. In
EU-led crisis management this is a supranational body responsible
for operational supervision and strategic control. In normal
times, Member States are represented in it by their permanent
representatives. What the role of EU high representative/Council
secretary general/WEU secretary general Javier Solana is in
this committee is not clear. Here EU defence policy is made
by the Member States and has not been communauterised. To
this extent the Commission is excluded from EU decision-making.
2) The Military Committee, which is comprised of
army commanders and their representatives at the rank of general
permanently located in Brussels. A Finnish general, Gustav
Hägglund, was elected by eight votes to seven to be the
chairman of this body (although after the vote 11 countries
stated that they supported his election). Hägglund is a Council
civil servant whose salary and armour-plated Mercedes are
paid for by Finland. Within the EU, he represents the Member
States, and not the EU.
3) The Military Staff, which provides its military
skill to support implementation of the ESDP, including the
management of EU-led military crisis management operations.
It assists in earmarking and securing national and multinational
forces for these purposes.
These new bodies were set up under the auspices of the Council,
i.e. Member States’ ministers. Their officials are Council
officials. Their work is not subject to parliamentary scrutiny
and is not granted discharge by any national or supranational
parliamentary institution.
Decisions by the Council to deploy crisis management troops
are made unanimously (abstentions do not prevent decisions
being taken). All Member States may participate in operations.
They are not forced to do so, but the pressure to take part
is overwhelming. Agreement was reached later on the distribution
of costs. Following the model in NATO, every participating
country pays the costs of its own participation and a share
of the small overheads.
Since crisis management can also be an offensive operation,
permission can be given either by the governments of the Member
States, bypassing the EU institutions, or by the Council,
as an EU institution.
The Helsinki final document states once again that "the Union
will contribute to international peace and security in accordance
with the principles of the United Nations Charter". However,
no agreement was reached on whether any attack on another
country would require a mandate from the international community,
i.e. the UN. The recent interpretation of the chairman of
the Military Committee, Gustav Hägglund, is that it is not
needed.
Our general does not set great store by NATO. In his experience
all its decisions are made in the USA.
The EU’s crisis management troops are not restricted by
geographical limitations. According to Hägglund only the scenario
of any crisis would impose any limitations on its activities:
larger numbers of heavily armed troops could be sent to incidents
close by, whereas for more distant operations fewer troops
would be sent and for less demanding tasks.
At Helsinki a non-military crisis management mechanism was
also established to reinforce the deployment of civil resources,
i.e. police forces.
It was decided to advance the Helsinki headline goals (HHG)
at the foreign ministers’ General Affairs Councils, where
defence ministers also take part. In this way the militarisation
of the EU progressed in that defence ministers began to participate
in EU activities, which they had not done before. They were
given a central role in equipping the Euroarmy and ironing
out any problems in the so-called Capabilities Commitment
Conferences, where military forces, ships and aeroplanes are
provided for the EU’s purposes.
"All these measures are being taken to support the common
foreign and security policy and they reinforce and expand
the Union’s wide-ranging external role." In order to be credible
in the wider world a new superpower needs an external military
role and a capacity to flex its muscles in foreign countries.
The documents of the Convention’s defence working party state
that "the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) means
that for the first time the European Union is able to deploy
military forces to promote and defend its interests". In other
words the idea of the Euroarmy is to defend the EU’s interests
outside the EU’ borders.
The question of whether the continued far-reaching militarisation
of the EU requires changes to the treaties was unresolved
in Helsinki, and this task fell to Portugal, which held the
EU presidency after Finland. After all, militarisation also
needs a legal base.
Under Portugal’s leadership it was decided that even more
demanding crisis management tasks (read: peace making) do
not require changes to the EU’s treaties; the wording of the
Amsterdam Treaty is sufficient. The treaties would have to
be amended if power is transferred from the Council to military
commanders, but that is not the case in EU crisis management.
According to press reports, the Lisbon summit discussed
what purposes Eurotroops could be used for. They can be sent
to conflicts centring on "disputes between ethnic or religious
groups, competition for scarce resources between states and
movements of peoples away from their home regions "
If this is what a Euroarmy can be used for, these are not
defence forces. The official documents from Lisbon, however,
make no mention of these intentions.
The final document from the Feira summit in Portugal
restates the principle that the EU wants to contribute to
international peace and security in accordance with the principles
of the United Nations Charter. Once again this is merely empty
wordplay since the EU is preparing to go on the offensive
without a mandate from the UN.
The annexes to the Feira summit set out how the Council
will act at the commencement and during the various stages
of any operations.
It was noted that the EU and NATO are by nature different
organisations. A desire was expressed for them to be equal
partners and for the EU’s right to make its own decisions.
In order to dispel US suspicions it was said that joint actions
with NATO would be based on shared values, equality and partnership.
NATO officers were asked to assess the implementation of the
Helsinki goals. Four working groups were set up with NATO
to discuss security issues, capabilities commitments, the
possibility of the EU using NATO resources and consultation
between the EU and NATO. EU applicant countries and non-EU
members of NATO were also encouraged to participate in EU-led
crisis management.
After Feira it appeared that so-called flexibility and the
attendant enhanced cooperation would be extended to the area
of defence. At the time flexibility was the buzzword in the
militarisation of the EU.
After Portugal, the first so-called Capabilities Commitment
Conference was held in Brussels during the French presidency
on 21 November 2000. Words were being put into deeds.
EU countries earmarked military units for the Euroarmy,
listed in a force catalogue. The troops were partly those
that had been provided for NATO purposes once before. 100,000
personnel, 400 helicopter gunships and 100 ships were committed
for EU purposes.
The troops were promised to the EU, but any deployment would
be the subject of a separate national decision. So the promise
of 100,000 soldiers is not a guarantee that 60,000 soldiers
could be made ready for a particular operation within 60 days.
Nonetheless, promises create pressures to keep those promises.
The meeting took note of some deficiencies. The EU countries
committed themselves to developing strategic troop transport
vehicles, command and monitoring centres and related information,
communication and espionage systems. In order to improve the
operational capability of troops in the field, search and
rescue resources, protection from ground-to-ground missiles,
precision weapons, logistics and various simulators will be
needed.
In order to correct these deficiencies, more "European "
military and armaments industries will be required. Key projects
identified were wide-bodied transport aircraft (the Airbus
A 400M), transport ships and troop transport helicopters (the
NH 90). Certain Member States’ efforts to make use of optical
and radar satellites (Helios II, SAR Lupe and Cosmos Skymed)
were noted as a positive development.
The EU countries’ Capabilities Commitment Conference was
followed by a meeting with ministers from the applicant and
partnership countries where further promises of troops and
armaments were received. If countries want to become members
of the EU, they are well advised to show active participation
in military projects.
At the Nice summit in December 2000 detailed documents
were approved on military cooperation between EU countries
and NATO, EU applicant countries and NATO Partnership for
Peace countries. Detailed rules were also decided upon for
the mode of operation of the EU’s own military bodies and
for the organisation of civil crisis management.
The desire was expressed to rapidly attain operational capability
for EU troops, the aim being to implement fully the Petersberg
tasks (read: peace making) in terms of capabilities commitments,
troop use and "permanent use" and compatibility aspects. Since
the goal was "a global perspective on crisis management",
the operating horizon is the entire globe.
It was said once again that a Euroarmy is not being set
up. But since assurances are constantly being issued that
this is not the case, then surely it is.
Obtaining NATO resources and troops in accordance with the
so-called Berlin Plus goal requires each individual NATO country’s
consent to work together with the EU. It also requires long-standing
enemies Greece and Turkey to reach agreement. The first to
strike a deal was Turkey, and then Greece, which was still
clinging to its previous position in autumn 2002.
At Nice it was stated that the collective defence of the
Member States is an issue for NATO but not the EU. The goal
set at Feira of increased "flexibility" was not achieved,
rather in foreign and security policy it applies only to the
implementation of decisions, not decision-making itself. The
EU will be allowed to develop into a military alliance only
by the unanimous decision of the Member States (read: the
large Member States). One could speak of flexibility if a
group of countries were able to introduce defence issues (and
NATO’s hard core) into the EU and other countries were able
to remain outside the inner circle in defence matters.
The EU’s second Capabilities Commitment Conference
in Brussels in November 2001 was in fact a quality-raising
conference. Once again, the ministers of the applicant countries
and the NATO countries met immediately after the conference.
Finland, a non-aligned country, increased the strength of
the unit promised to the EU to 2000 men. Sweden held its level
at 900 soldiers and Denmark has not yet provided Danish troops
for the common army. After the conference the pool from which
the EU may obtain troops (without it being able to decide
itself on their availability) contained 120,000 soldiers.
At the conference the foreign and defence ministers repeated
their call for the Helsinki goals to be fulfilled. It was
noted that special efforts will be needed if the most demanding
operations are to be implemented. Agreement was reached on
a special European Capability Action Plan to rationalise Member
States’ defence efforts and create compatibility between national
and international projects. Strengthening of the armaments
industry will progress from the bottom up: Member States will
cooperate in armaments on a voluntary basis and pursuant to
national decisions.
At the Laeken summit during the Belgian presidency
in December 2001 it was decided that operational capability
had been reached in "some operations" in crisis management.
This conclusion was premature. The EU did not have the capability
for operations in practice. NATO resources were not available
– because of the quarrel between Greece and Turkey.
Again, the documents stated that a European army was not
about to be created. It was stated that the capability of
a body that is not a Euroarmy had been tested in a series
of staff exercises.
The most important decision at Laeken was to start preparations
for an EU constitution. The Convention was asked whether the
scope of the Petersberg tasks should be extended. This has
grown into a far broader question in the Convention: should
the EU have a common defence and a common arms industry?
During its presidency in spring 2002 Spain convened 17 working
groups to consider outstanding issues in 24 separate sub-areas
of crisis management.
At the same time military exercises continued.
The EU’s first military staff exercise of its own, CME 02,
was held on 22-28 May 2002 between Brussels and the capitals
of the Member States. Once again it was an exercise. Outsiders
were not informed as to the subject of the exercise: where
the enemy came from or where the attack was directed.
The Sevilla summit of summer 2002 attempted to reach
agreement between Greece and Turkey on making NATO resources
available, but the Greeks dug in and no deal was made. This
became a real issue in autumn 2002, when the EU was offered
the opportunity to practice EU-led crisis management in the
field for real for the first time. Amber Fox , a NATO-led
peace-keeping exercise was coming to an end in Macedonia in
late October, and the EU was offered the opportunity to take
over the leadership before it is, in future, faced with more
demanding offensive (peace making and enforcement) tasks.
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