An appraisal of Technologies of Political Control

This material is an excerpt from the Interim Study ordered by the STOA Panel of the
European Parliament. The study is named "An appraisal of Technologies of Political Control"
(Luxembourg 19.1.1998, Directorate General for Research).
The author is Mr. Steve Wright, Omega Foundation, Manchester.
MEP Esko Seppänen is a member of the STOA Panel.

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"4.4. NATIONAL & INTERNATIONAL INTERCEPTION NETWORKS

Modern communications systems are virtually transparent to the advanced interceptions equipment which can be used to listen in. Some systems even lend themselves to a dual role as a national interceptions network. For example the message switching system used on digital exchanges like System X in the UK supports an Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) Protocol. This allows digital devices, e.g. fax to share the system with existing lines. The ISDN subset is defined in their documents as "Signalling CCITT1-series interface for ISDN access". What is not widely known is that built in to the international CCITT protocol is the ability to take phones 'off hook' and listen into conversations occurring near the phone, without the user being aware that this is happening. (SGR Newsletter, No.4, 1993) This effectively means that a national dial up telephone tapping capacity is built into these systems from the start. (System X has been exported to Russia & China) Similarly, the digital technology required to pinpoint mobile phone users for incoming calls, means that all mobile phone users in a country when activated, are mini-tracking devices, giving their owners whereabouts at any time and stored in the company's computer for up to two years. Coupled with System X technology, this is a custom built mobile track, tail and tap system per excellence. (Sunday Telegraph, 2.2.1997)

Within Europe, all e-mail, telephone and fax communications are routinely intercepted by the United States National Security Agency, transferring all target information from the European mainland via the strategic hub of London then by satellite to Fort Meade in Maryland via the crucial hub at Menwith Hill in the North York Moors of the UK. The system was first uncovered in the 1970's by a group of researches in the UK (Campbell, 1981). The researchers used open sources but were subsequently arrested under Britain's Official Secrets legislation. The 'ABC' trial that followed was a critical turning point in researcher's understanding both of the technology of political control and how it might be challenged by research on open sources. (See Aubrey, 1981 & Hooper 1987) Other work on what is now known as Signals intelligence was undertaken by researchers such as James Bamford, which uncovered a billion dollar word wide interceptions network, which he nicknamed 'Puzzle Palace'. A recent work by by Nicky Hager, Secret Power, (Hager, 1996) provides the most comprehensive details todate of a project known as ECHELON. Hager interviewed more than 50 people concerned with intelligence to document a global surveillance system that stretches around the world to form a targeting system to all of the key Intelsat satellites used to convey most of the world's satellite phone calls, internet, e-mail, faxes and telexes. These sites are based at Sugar Grove and Yakima, the USA, at Waihopal in New Zealand, at Geraldton in Australia, Hong Kong, and Morwenstow in the UK.

The ECHELON system forms part of the UKUSA system but unlike many electronic spy systems developed during the cold war, ECHELON is designed for primarily non-military targets: governments, organisations and businesses in virtually every country. The ECHELON system works by indiscriminately intercepting very large quantities of communications and then siphoning out what is valuable using artificial intelligence aids like Memex. to find out key words. Five nations share the results with the US as the senior partner under the UKUSA agreement of 1948, Britain, Canada and Australia are very much acting as subordinate information servicers.

Each of the five centres supply "dictionaries" to the other four of keywords, Phrases, people and places to "tag" and tagged intercept is forwarded straight to the requesting country. Whlist there is much information gathered about potential terrorists, there is a lot of economic intelligence, notable intensive monitoring of all the countries participating in the GATT negotiations. But Hager found that by far the main priorities of this system continued to be military and political intelligence applicable to their wider interests. Hager quotes from a "highly placed intelligence operatives" who spoke to the Observer in London. "We feel we can no longer remain silent regarding that which we regard to be gross malpractice and negligence within the establishment in which we operate." They gave examples. GCHQ interception of three charities, including Amnesty International and Christian Aid. "At any time GCHQ is able to home in on their communications for a routine target request," the GCHQ source said. In the case of phone taps the procedure in known an Mantis. With telexes its called Mayfly. By keying in a code relating third world aid, the source was able to demonstrate telex "fixes" on the three organisations. With no system accountability, it is difficult to discover what criteria determine who is not a target.

In February, the UK based research publication Statewatch reported that the EU had secretly agreed to set up an international telephone tapping network via a secret network of committees established under the "third pillar" of the Maastricht Treaty covering cooperation on law and order. \key points of the plan are outlined in a memorandum of understanding, signed by EU states in 1995. (ENFOPOL 112 10037/95 25.10.1995) which remains classified. According to a Guardian report (25.2.97) it reflects concern among European Intelligence agencies that modern technology will prevent them from tapping private communications. "EU countries" it says, should agree on "international interception standards set at a level that would ensure encoding or scrambled words can be broken down by government agencies." Official reports say that the EU governments agreed to co-operate closely with the FBI in Washington. Yet earlier minutes of these meetings suggest that the original initiative came from Washington. According to Statewatch, network and service providers in the EU will be obliged to install "tappable" systems and to place under surveillance any person or group when served with a interception order. These plans have never been referred to any European government for scrutiny, nor one suspects to the Civil Liberties Committee of the European Parliament, despite the clear civil liberties issues raised by such an accountable system. We are told that the USA, Australia, Canada, Norway and Hong Kong are ready to sign up. All these bar Norway are parties to the ECHELON system and it is impossible to determine if there are not other agendas at work here. Nothing is said about finance of this system but a report produced by the German government estimates that the mobile phone part of the package alone will cost 4 billion D-marks.

Statewatch concludes that "It is the interface of the ECHELON system and its potential development on phone calls combined with the standardisation of "tappable communications centres and equipment being sponsored by the EU and USA which presents a truly global threat over which there are no legal democratic control." (Press release 25.2.97)

Clearly, there need to be a wide ranging debate on the significance of these proposals before further any further political or financial commitments are made. The following recommendations have that objective in mind. (...)"