An appraisal of Technologies of Political Control
This material is an excerpt from the Interim Study ordered by the STOA Panel of the
European Parliament. The study is named "An appraisal of Technologies of Political
Control"
(Luxembourg 19.1.1998, Directorate General for Research).
The author is Mr. Steve Wright, Omega Foundation, Manchester.
MEP Esko Seppänen is a member of the STOA Panel.
* * *
"4.4. NATIONAL & INTERNATIONAL INTERCEPTION NETWORKS
Modern communications systems are virtually transparent to the advanced interceptions
equipment which can be used to listen in. Some systems even lend themselves to a dual role
as a national interceptions network. For example the message switching system used on
digital exchanges like System X in the UK supports an Integrated Services Digital Network
(ISDN) Protocol. This allows digital devices, e.g. fax to share the system with existing
lines. The ISDN subset is defined in their documents as "Signalling CCITT1-series
interface for ISDN access". What is not widely known is that built in to the
international CCITT protocol is the ability to take phones 'off hook' and listen into
conversations occurring near the phone, without the user being aware that this is
happening. (SGR Newsletter, No.4, 1993) This effectively means that a national dial up
telephone tapping capacity is built into these systems from the start. (System X has been
exported to Russia & China) Similarly, the digital technology required to pinpoint
mobile phone users for incoming calls, means that all mobile phone users in a country when
activated, are mini-tracking devices, giving their owners whereabouts at any time and
stored in the company's computer for up to two years. Coupled with System X technology,
this is a custom built mobile track, tail and tap system per excellence. (Sunday
Telegraph, 2.2.1997)
Within Europe, all e-mail, telephone and fax communications are routinely intercepted
by the United States National Security Agency, transferring all target information from
the European mainland via the strategic hub of London then by satellite to Fort Meade in
Maryland via the crucial hub at Menwith Hill in the North York Moors of the UK. The system
was first uncovered in the 1970's by a group of researches in the UK (Campbell, 1981). The
researchers used open sources but were subsequently arrested under Britain's Official
Secrets legislation. The 'ABC' trial that followed was a critical turning point in
researcher's understanding both of the technology of political control and how it might be
challenged by research on open sources. (See Aubrey, 1981 & Hooper 1987) Other work on
what is now known as Signals intelligence was undertaken by researchers such as James
Bamford, which uncovered a billion dollar word wide interceptions network, which he
nicknamed 'Puzzle Palace'. A recent work by by Nicky Hager, Secret Power, (Hager, 1996)
provides the most comprehensive details todate of a project known as ECHELON. Hager
interviewed more than 50 people concerned with intelligence to document a global
surveillance system that stretches around the world to form a targeting system to all of
the key Intelsat satellites used to convey most of the world's satellite phone calls,
internet, e-mail, faxes and telexes. These sites are based at Sugar Grove and Yakima, the
USA, at Waihopal in New Zealand, at Geraldton in Australia, Hong Kong, and Morwenstow in
the UK.
The ECHELON system forms part of the UKUSA system but unlike many electronic spy
systems developed during the cold war, ECHELON is designed for primarily non-military
targets: governments, organisations and businesses in virtually every country. The ECHELON
system works by indiscriminately intercepting very large quantities of communications and
then siphoning out what is valuable using artificial intelligence aids like Memex. to find
out key words. Five nations share the results with the US as the senior partner under the
UKUSA agreement of 1948, Britain, Canada and Australia are very much acting as subordinate
information servicers.
Each of the five centres supply "dictionaries" to the other four of keywords,
Phrases, people and places to "tag" and tagged intercept is forwarded straight
to the requesting country. Whlist there is much information gathered about potential
terrorists, there is a lot of economic intelligence, notable intensive monitoring of all
the countries participating in the GATT negotiations. But Hager found that by far the main
priorities of this system continued to be military and political intelligence applicable
to their wider interests. Hager quotes from a "highly placed intelligence
operatives" who spoke to the Observer in London. "We feel we can no longer
remain silent regarding that which we regard to be gross malpractice and negligence within
the establishment in which we operate." They gave examples. GCHQ interception of
three charities, including Amnesty International and Christian Aid. "At any time GCHQ
is able to home in on their communications for a routine target request," the GCHQ
source said. In the case of phone taps the procedure in known an Mantis. With telexes its
called Mayfly. By keying in a code relating third world aid, the source was able to
demonstrate telex "fixes" on the three organisations. With no system
accountability, it is difficult to discover what criteria determine who is not a target.
In February, the UK based research publication Statewatch reported that the EU had
secretly agreed to set up an international telephone tapping network via a secret network
of committees established under the "third pillar" of the Maastricht Treaty
covering cooperation on law and order. \key points of the plan are outlined in a
memorandum of understanding, signed by EU states in 1995. (ENFOPOL 112 10037/95
25.10.1995) which remains classified. According to a Guardian report (25.2.97) it reflects
concern among European Intelligence agencies that modern technology will prevent them from
tapping private communications. "EU countries" it says, should agree on
"international interception standards set at a level that would ensure encoding or
scrambled words can be broken down by government agencies." Official reports say that
the EU governments agreed to co-operate closely with the FBI in Washington. Yet earlier
minutes of these meetings suggest that the original initiative came from Washington.
According to Statewatch, network and service providers in the EU will be obliged to
install "tappable" systems and to place under surveillance any person or group
when served with a interception order. These plans have never been referred to any
European government for scrutiny, nor one suspects to the Civil Liberties Committee of the
European Parliament, despite the clear civil liberties issues raised by such an
accountable system. We are told that the USA, Australia, Canada, Norway and Hong Kong are
ready to sign up. All these bar Norway are parties to the ECHELON system and it is
impossible to determine if there are not other agendas at work here. Nothing is said about
finance of this system but a report produced by the German government estimates that the
mobile phone part of the package alone will cost 4 billion D-marks.
Statewatch concludes that "It is the interface of the ECHELON system and its
potential development on phone calls combined with the standardisation of "tappable
communications centres and equipment being sponsored by the EU and USA which presents a
truly global threat over which there are no legal democratic control." (Press release
25.2.97)
Clearly, there need to be a wide ranging debate on the significance of these proposals
before further any further political or financial commitments are made. The following
recommendations have that objective in mind. (...)"
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