Esko Seppänen MEP at the meeting of the GUE/NGL
group
6.3.2003
In Europe, the most significant redistribution of power since
the Second World War is currently underway. It is taking place
in the EU’s constitution.
Only nation states have constitutions. The EU is being made
into a state: a federal state. People have stopped speaking
of a constitutional treaty and are openly preparing a constitution,
which will take precedence over the laws of the Member States.
According to Article 9 of the draft (6.2.2003), “The
Constitution, and law adopted by the Union Institutions in
exercising competences conferred on it by the Constitution,
shall have primacy over the law of the Member States.”
The draft constitution begins as follows: “Reflecting
the will of the peoples and the States of Europe to build
a common future, this Constitution establishes a Union [entitled
…], within which the policies of the Member States shall
be coordinated, and which shall administer certain common
competences on a federal basis.”
What is being established, then, is a new Union which in
the case of the functions transferred to it will operate like
a federal state. The question of its name remains open, but
it has been suggested that the new Union would be called the
United States of Europe or United Europe. The new Union needs
to have a new name, so that it can be distinguished from the
old in the same way that since Maastricht the EC has been
a different institution than the EU.
What is being established is a Union which reflects the will
of the peoples and states. If these do not happen to have
the same will, then whose will is to be decisive?
In the case of powers brought within the Community framework
(communitised) , the new Union will become a federal state.
Federal states are characterised by centralised power and
supranational decision-making.
Supranational decision-making means that the will of the
majority is decisive, and that the states which remain in
the minority must execute the common decisions. For communitised
matters, the power of decision becomes a monopoly of the centralised
power.
A national democracy, which is based on a parliamentary system
or “parliamentarism”, is a superior form of representative
democracy to the EU’s supranational decision-making.
There is no satisfactory theoretical definition of the concept
of “supranational democracy”. How do we distinguish
democratic majority decisions from dictation and force based
on majority power? At a time when the EU is being made into
the world’s second largest federal state, it is legitimate
to ask whether it will be too big to be governed democratically,
and whether democracy is possible only in those states where
there is no supranational decision-making?
We cannot live in the hope that, over time, the EU federal
state will become democratic. It must be democratic as early
as the design stage and the concept of a “supranational
democracy” needs to be thoroughly clarified.
In the Convention, where a draft constitution is being created
from the top downwards for five hundred million Europeans,
there prevails a total federalist hegemony. The overwhelming
majority of members and deputy members want the EU to become
a federal state. A large majority supports the Community method
as the EU’s method of decision-making.
Those of us who support the intergovernmental method number
only 15 (out of 207). We are from various different countries,
and from all party groups.
The smaller the number of those who make the decisions in
representative decision-making, the more unrepresentative
will be the final result: difference and diversity are cut
out. If only a small number of representatives are elected,
only the mainstream trends will get their voices heard. The
mainstream trend of policy in EU constitutional questions
is federalism. The desire is to make the EU a federal state
and a superpower.
The Convention contains 5-6 representatives of the parties
of the GUE/NGL group (less than 3% of the representatives).
In other words, from our point of view the Convention does
not correspond to the relative political strengths of the
EU countries.
A new feature is that supranational parties have been involved
in the drafting of the EU Treaty. The representatives of four
Europe-wide parties have each produced their own proposal
for a constitution, and strive to work in the Convention within
the Community framework. It is not certain, however, whether
the national parties will commit themselves to the view of
the supranational “europarties”, or of their majority.
The europarties are still, up to now, synthetic creations.
The Convention participants from the GUE/NGL group have no
resources – and neither do they have the united thinking
– to produce their own common proposal.
Timetable
The Convention’s praesidium, which cannot be accused
of democratic procedures, has published the framework of the
constitution and some of the new Articles which it has been
preparing.
According to the plan, the constitution would be divided
into three parts: 1) the constitutional part (about 50 Articles),
2) Union policies and their implementation and 3) general
and final provisions. In addition to this, a lofty preamble
is being written for it.
The constitution will be secular law; however the Pope and
other religious figures want it to have a reference to Europe’s
Christian tradition as the ethical base of the new Union.
The first draft Articles have been published and the drafting
process is continuing. The praesidium’s proposed constitution
will be ready by the end of April.
The Convention has set itself a target by which its work
would be ready to send to the Intergovernmental Conference
(IGC) at the Thessalonika Summit on 20-21.6.2003. Since the
federalists exercise hegemony in the Convention, their goal
is for the constitution to be approved at Thessalonika in
the form which is proposed by the Convention. They would like
the matter to be an open-and-shut case at the IGC to be convened
in the autumn.
They want to change the timetable originally set, according
to which the IGC would not be summoned until spring 2004.
Originally, there was a desire to leave the Governments and
Parliaments time for proper discussion of and reaction to
the Convention’s proposal. There is now an unwillingness
to give this time, since as time drags on the “package”
produced by the Convention would have to be opened and the
federalists do not want this.
Mr Berlusconi wants the constitution to be finally approved
at the Rome Summit in December 2003. He would like to see
a new EU, with a new Treaty of Rome.
The first countries may well try to take the constitution
to a national referendum at the same time as the next European
elections, in June 2004.
Following ratifications by the Member States, the constitution
would achieve legal force during 2007-2008. Then, a new European
Union would be born, which would have legal personality in
its own right and which would use its powers in the manner
of a federal state.
Approval procedure
It is not known how the Convention will decide regarding its
own proposal, nor is it known how the Member States will decide
nationally regarding approval of the constitution.
In the Convention, the federalists want to produce one proposal
which can be approved by the largest possible majority of
Convention participants. Unanimity will not be reached, and
so this is not being sought. If it is insisted that the Convention
does not vote on the final result, a “quasi-majority”
will be sought: it will be stated that the majority supports
the proposal without voting.
In the Convention, it may be possible to lodge dissenting
opinions on the draft constitution, but it is unlikely that
the large countries or large political groups will do so.
These will try to find a compromise, which will involve structures
of both the Community method and the intergovernmental method.
Without such consensus the IGC will not approve the package
in the form written by the Convention.
The Union needs legitimacy. In order to achieve this, in
Ireland and Denmark a referendum will be organised in compliance
with their national law, and this may also be done elsewhere,
at least in the Netherlands, Portugal and France.
A national referendum should be demanded in all Member States,
on the same day!
With the advent of the new Union, the old Union will be thrown
on the scrapheap of history; but how this will happen has
not yet been decided. Legally, the old Union has to be abolished
unanimously. Now, it is difficult to believe that 22-23 countries
will not be able to found a new Union if 2-3 countries reject
the new constitution and do not agree to abolish the old Union
and transfer its resources to the new one.
A new legal form will be generated for the EU from the political
will of the current governing class, and no single country
will be able to prevent this. Enacting the constitution is
a process wherein jurisprudence yields to policy.
It is not known what will happen to the countries which reject
the constitution and do not join the new Union. There have
already been threats of their being shut out of EU cooperation
and the common market.
It is probable that some sort of association option will
remain for the old EU countries. However, the threat of remaining
outside will surely pressure all countries towards approving
the constitution which is being prepared in the Convention.
Competences
On the basis of the first Articles, the division between the
competences of the Union (= the central power) and its independent
Member States is not made clear.
Powers fall into three categories: the Union’s monopoly
competences, shared competences and the Union’s supporting
actions in matters which fall under national authority.
This division of competences is not written into the constitutional
part, but rather into the second part, which defines the Union’s
policies.
On the basis of the Articles of the constitutional part,
there is a clear desire for further harmonisation of economic
policy, and for more of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
to be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Union.
The division of power in these matters is linked to the resolution
of institutional questions.
The Community method
The fact that someone supports the Community method does not
make that person “right-wing” or “left-wing”.
It makes him or her a federalist. Those of the left in Northern
Europe are more anti-federalist than those in the South.
The federalists reckon that by the Community method the EU
will become a federal state, which is their goal.
The most essential feature of the Community method is the
desire to make the decisions in the EU’s own institutions
according to their relative strengths. This means that as
many new areas as possible will fall within the competence
of the Community. This is supranational decision-making, and
does not include the Member States’ right of veto. The
Member States who remain in the minority must be satisfied
with the will of the majority, and must implement the joint
decisions (of the central power).
The federalists want as many matters as possible to be decided
within the EU’s institutions by a qualified majority,
and they want the qualified majority decisions to go automatically
to the codecision procedure with the supranational European
Parliament.
The Community method includes a strong Commission, which
represents the central power. In that sense it will be a civil
service power, or a “eurocracy”.
The federalists want the Commissioners to become the parliamentary
government of the new federal state, which will enjoy the
confidence of a supranational European Parliament. Related
to this, the federalists want to elect the President of the
Commission as President of the EU; this president would be
elected by a qualified majority in the supranational European
Parliament. Through this arrangement, the Commission would
become the federal state government.
The federalists also want to communitise more of the areas
which define national sovereignty by placing them within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Communities.
Through this, the political will of the large countries will
assume a false mask of legality. The judgements of the EC’s
joint courts of justice will reflect federal legislation.
The Community method is supported by all the Europe-wide
parties. When the Union is transformed into a federal state,
the parties too will become supranational. Of these europarties,
the one which supports the federal state most clearly has
been the European People’s Party (PPE).
The intergovernmental method
A move to the pure Community method would mean that the current
intergovernmental method would be downgraded.
This method involves decisions being made within the EU institutions
but – with the exception of matters pertaining to the
codecision procedure – between representatives of the
national governments. The desire is to make decisions ultimately
within the Council, not within the supranational Parliament
or the Commission, which enjoys the confidence of the Parliament.
The greater the proportion of EU decisions that are made
unanimously, the greater the opportunity of a single state
to exert influence. Through this, the right is generated for
such a state to veto decisions which are negative from its
own point of view. The more decisions that are made by qualified
majority, the more the EU will make decisions in the manner
of a federal state.
An alternative to a federal state and to supranational decision-making
would be a democratisation of the current intergovernmental
method: increasing transparency and publicity, and the extensive
discussion of EU affairs in national parliaments.
The intergovernmental method should include the power of
national parliaments in important matters, and particularly
in the reform of the founding treaties. The power of national
parliaments and the European Parliament cannot be reconciled.
It is not easy for “europarliamentarism” to gain
legitimacy in nation states, since this is supranational power
in which the sovereignty of small countries is not protected
against the centralised power formed by large countries.
The Convention is currently creating a situation in which
no possibility will remain for national parliaments other
than to say YES or NO to the constitution.
.
They defend this lack of alternatives by the fact that, in
the Convention, each parliament has two representatives.
This is not however an adequate justification for an actual
transfer of power from national decision-making organs to
a supranational Convention. The basic problem of the Convention
is specifically its unrepresentative nature and a mode of
operation which makes it impossible to properly discuss Convention
matters in national parliaments. In the affairs of the Convention,
parliamentarism – which is one of the characteristics
of democracy – is not being implemented; drafting responsibility
lies with governments, which must enjoy the confidence of
national parliaments.
Qualified majority
The federalists, who exercise hegemony in the Convention,
want to enact supranational laws by qualified majority. This
means that small states will lose the right of veto. Large
states will retain it: according to the Treaty of Nice, three
such big countries together, in which 38% of the EU’s
residents live, will have the right of veto on qualified majority
decisions.
Since large countries have a large representation in the
European Parliament, their power would also grow due to the
fact that all the qualified majority decisions of the Councils
would automatically lead to the codecision procedure with
the European Parliament.
If power is transferred via the qualified majority and codecision
procedures to the central power, this means that it will be
removed from national decision-making bodies. It is not easy
to gain legitimacy for this on the basis of the drafting work
of the Convention. Few of those half a billion Europeans,
who are the objects of this drafting, feel that the Convention
represents them, nor do they feel that the nations need or
desire a constitution dictated from above.
The proposal of Germany and France
When Germany and France found that the Convention was moving
towards the character of an intergovernmental conference they
appointed their Foreign Ministers to the Convention. Greece
and many of the applicant countries have followed their lead.
Not all countries (the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Austria,
Luxembourg) have a representative in the Convention’s
presidium or secretariat, which draft the initial documents.
Power is the ability to write the initial documents.
Whereas formerly it was thought that the EU would only become
a federal state by the Community method, Germany and France
are now creating a centralised power for the EU, which will
make it a federal state, also by the intergovernmental method.
They have demanded – and, through their demands, are
obtaining – a legal personality of its own for the EU.
According to these demands, the constitution will include
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights produced by the previous
Convention. They want the use of a qualified majority in all
decision making, including foreign and security policy. They
are demanding an increase in the power of the supranational
European Parliament, via an increased use of the codecision
procedure. In addition, they want two new presidents to be
elected for the EU by qualified majority decisions (which
favour large countries), one for the Council and one for the
Commission, and the establishment of the post of EU Foreign
Minister and an EU diplomatic administration.
Germany and France thus want a head of the Council who would
be called the President. This Council President would not
be chosen by the nations, but rather appointed by the European
Council, i.e. by the euro élite (and possibly out of
their own ranks). He would represent the French concept of
the EU’s nature. France does not wish to increase the
power of the faceless, odourless and tasteless eurocrats in
military affairs, nor does it wish to give global policy into
the jurisdiction of the Commission.
The question of how decisions will be made regarding military
and defence policy remains open. Germany and France want a
common defence for the EU, which would be compatible with
NATO and which would be reinforced by common armament. They
may demand that a central defence obligation be written into
the constitution, in the form of Article 5 of the WEU. For
crisis management, which includes the enforcement of peace
or in other words war, they want special common armament criteria
in the manner of the EMU convergence criteria.
The EU Member States manage regional defence and the defence
of conflicts between states through NATO. They have submitted
their own armies directly to NATO command. The most expensive
part of military costs is represented by espionage and reconnaissance,
signals and communication, plus military command systems with
their underground complexes. Since these already rest with
NATO and it has been agreed that NATO will also donate them
for use in EU crisis management operations, no-one is prepared
to duplicate them.
In the EU region, there are 2 million soldiers in various
armies. At the Helsinki summit it was decided to set up special
crisis management forces, i.e. euro armies. For the purpose
of these, 200,000 soldiers have been reserved, i.e. all forces
of EU armies that are suitable for joint action. Of these,
60,000 soldiers would be in combat action at any one time.
The euro armies are not being set up for defence, but are
for attack. The creation of a federal state type of superpower
requires that the EU has its own crisis management attack
forces. Crisis management is not front-line war, but restricted
operations.
Since France has concentrated on securing the power of the
Council in foreign, security and defence policy and Germany
has supported this, Germany in turn has obtained the aid of
France in Community affairs for resolutions in the affairs
of the old Pillars I and III, which embody the spirit of a
federal state and which reinforce central power.
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