EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy

PROVISIONAL

2003/0021(CNS)

23 September 2003

*

DRAFT REPORT

on the proposal for a Council (Euratom) directive on setting out basic obligations and general principles on the safety of nuclear installations(COM/2003) 32 – C5-0228/2003 – 2003/0021(CNS))

Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy

Rapporteur:Esko Olavi Seppänen

 

 

PR_CNS_am

PROCEDURAL PAGE *

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION *

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT *

By letter of {13/05/2003}13 May 2003 the Council consulted Parliament, pursuant to Articles 31, 32 and 187 of the Euratom Treaty, on the proposal for a Council (Euratom) directive on setting out basic obligations and general principles on the safety of nuclear installations (COM/2003) 32 – 2003/0021(CNS)).

At the sitting of {15/05/2003}15 May 2003 the President of Parliament announced that he had referred the proposal to the {ITRE}Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy as the committee responsible and the {ENVI}Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy for its opinion (C5-0228/2003).

The {ITRE}Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy appointed Esko Olavi Seppänen rapporteur at its meeting of {22/05/2003}22 May 2003.

The committee considered the Commission proposal and draft report at its meetings of 9 Juli 2003, 9 September 2003, ... .

At the latter/last meeting it adopted the draft legislative resolution by ... votes to ..., with ... abstention(s)/unanimously.

The following were present for the vote ... (chairman/acting chair(wo)man), ... (vice-chair(wo)man), ... (vice-chair(wo)man), Esko Olavi Seppänen (rapporteur), ..., ... (for ...), ... (for ... pursuant to Rule 153(2)), ... and ... .

The opinion of the Committee on {ENVI}the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy is attached.

The report was tabled on ... .

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM/2003) 32),

– having regard to Articles 31, 32 and 187 of the Euratom Treaty, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C5-0228/2003),

– having regard to Rule 67 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the {ITRE}Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy and the opinion of the {ENVI}Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy (A5-0000/2003),

1. Approves the Commission proposal as amended;

2. Calls on the Commission to alter its proposal accordingly, pursuant to Article 250(2) of the EC Treaty/Article 119, second paragraph, of the Euratom Treaty;

3. Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

4. Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to amend the Commission proposal substantially;

5. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council and Commission.

Amendment 1

[The legal base of the Commission´s proposal may need this extension.]

Amendment 2

[The proposal includes all nuclear installations, and the mining must not be excluded.]

Article 1, paragraph 2

Amendment 3

[Who bears the ultimate responsibility needs to be clearly stated.]

Article 1, paragraph 2 a (new)

Amendment 4

[Military installations may cause the same health and environmental problems as civil ones, and, therefor, cannot be excluded.]

Article 2, paragraph 1, point 1

Amendment 5

Article 7, paragraph 1

Amendment 6

Article 9, paragraph 3 a (new)

Amendment 7

Article 12, paragraph 1

Amendment 8

[There is no dispute settlement mechanism in the draft Directive, but the Member States must have a 
right to challenge the Commission´s conclusions.]

Article 12, paragraph 5

Amendment 9

[New Article 12.7.
The Commission prepares methods to ensure Member States´ compliance snd rules on sanctions in case 
of non-compliance.]
[Justification
The Member States must know the sanctions for the non-compliance of the rules.]

Annex, paragraph 1, point 3

Amendment 10

[The liquidity of the assets must be secured.]

Annex, paragraph 1, point 4

Amendment 11

[There is no definition of "exceptional and duly justified reason".]

Draft European Parliament legislative resolution, point 1

Amendment 12

[The Parliament has requested the Commission to draft the directive on nuclear safety, but this current proposal will not lead to common, stricter, more transparent, more demanding or legally binding nuclear safety standards. Therefore, the Rapporteur proposes that the proposed Directive be rejected and invites the Commission to prepare a new, improved proposal which includes fixed dates and timetables for the Member States to react. The new directive could be divaded into two separate parts: one part on the nuclear safety and another on the administration of the decommissioning funds, both with appropriate legal bases.]

Draft European Parliament legislative resolution, point 1

The Member States have differing views on the production of nuclear energy and disposal of radioactive waste. Any harmonisation of nuclear safety legislation cannot change the basic differences of opinions in the individual Member States on nuclear energy, and nuclear safety measures and public acceptance of the nuclear risks differ considerably from one Member State to another.

The aim of the Commission is to ensure the use of best nuclear safety practice in all Member States, and the Commission´s proposal applies to all civilian nuclear facilities.

As long as there is commercial exploitation of nuclear power, excellent nuclear safety levels are required.

The Commission´s proposal fails to indicate any weaknesses in current nuclear safety regulation.

The Nuclear Safety Convention concluded under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) neither contains technical rules nor is legally binding. All EU countries are Parties to it and implement it.

The technical standards drawn up under the aegis of the IAEA contribute to improving nuclear safety, but the IAEA standards are not formulated with the criteria for legal texts in mind, and they include differences in various safety factors.

The IAEA is an intergovernmental decision-making mechanism. The Commission´s proposal, however, would provide for a Community Approach: a regional, non-global adoption and adaptation process of legally-binding texts. The Member States are free to apply more rigorous rules themselves.

The definitions and rules of the IAEA are used by the Commission as a general reference framework and reference point for checking that these are fully and rigorously applied by the Member States. The IAEA´s procedure for setting standards should not be replicated within the EU.

The legal basis for the action complementing the basic standards is provided for in the Chapter 3 of the Title II of the Euratom Treaty.

This chapter of the Treaty has been used with regard to radiation protection, but in the draft Directive, the health protection is extended to cover both radiation protection and nuclear safety.

The legal base provides for the adoption of the Directive by qualified majority, whereas many other Articles (in particular the Article 203) of the Euratom Treaty require adoption by unanimity. The European Parliament is consulted. If the legal base were Article 203, the Commission seeking new powers under Euratom Treaty is unlikely to get the unanimous support of Member States

The Commission cites in its explanatory statement the European Court of Justice case C-29/99 in the following way: "Under Articles 30 to 32 of the Euratom Treaty, the Community possesses legislative competence to establish, for the purpose of health protection, an authorisation system which must be applied by the Member States. Such a legislative act constitutes a measure supplementing the basic standards referred in that article." According to the Commission´s interpretation, this judgement expands its competence to the field proposed. The legal consequences of the case are, however, not clear.

A specific procedure has to be followed in developing common standards. The Commission needs an opinion from a group of persons appointed by a Scientific and Technical Committee and needs to consult the Economic and Social Committee. In their respective opinions, both have questioned the legal base.

The legal base may go beyond the scope of the Euratom Treaty and possibly does not cover certain aspects regulated in the proposed articles. The decommissioning funds do not have implications for health practicalities and have more to do with administration and organisational structures.

The proposal may result in a transfer of traditionally exclusive national competence to the domain of shared competence.

When the draft Directive does not contain any procedure for drawing up the technical standards, the main question is: through which kind of legal instruments and when will the evolution of the legal framework take place. The Commission has no answer.

There is a public demand for improved nuclear safety standards and a global safety regime with one common set of safety standards not merely to be considered as a lowest common denominator.

The Commission says that its proposal is not a Framework Directive, and it does not plan new directives to be drafted for the nuclear safety. Its approach needs, however, to be supplemented by more far-reaching legal instruments to be legally binding.

It remains unclear how the development and approval procedure of potential EU nuclear safety technical standards, including operational standards, will be arranged and what will be their legal status.

The Commission lacks the human and financial resources to carry out the tasks proposed by the Directive. Therefore, the resource demands need to be recalculated in the legislative financial statement in order to make the Community Approach credible.

The peer-review process based on the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety is considered the most effective mechanism for keeping countries under pressure to maintain high levels of safety based on global standards.

Peer reviews consist of international team of experts who observe and review plant operations. The Community approach does not forsee plant reviews.

Article 187 of the Euratom Treaty should also be considered: "The Commission may, within the limits and under the conditions laid down by the Council in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, collect any information and carry out any checks required for the performance of the tasks entrusted to it." This text provides for a general framework for verification teams, for reports on national situations, and for the critical review of these reports.

It is not clear what kind of access the verification teams will have to the documentation of the regulator, and it is not clear if the inspection reports are to be made public.

The Commission will have the monopoly to decide what to verify and decide on any subsequent action: whether and how the observations of the verification team should be followed.

The suggested process may multiply the number of the reports with rather similar contents.

The Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) are committed to a national responsibility for safety and the independence of their regulators.

The assessment of nuclear safety requires a thorough familiarity with the details of each nuclear facility and the technology used, as well as an understanding of how various relevant safety factors are integrated . Each country should benchmark its own experience to the international practice.

Responsibilities and roles must be made clear and must not be obscured. The prime responsibility for the safety of the nuclear installation rests with the licence holder. There cannot be a Community responsibility for the safety of nuclear installations, but the sole and ultimate responsibility must be that of the operator ("polluter pays") and that of the national regulatory institution(s).

In the Accession Countries, the requirements and the level of nuclear safety are largely the same as in current EU Member States. The proposed framework Directive does not make new significant additional requirements on Member States or Accession Countries.

The ultimate management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and other wastes account for the majority of the costs of decommissioning. To deal with the decommissioning costs is to guarantee that the financial resources are available for all aspects.

The operator should have the sole responsibility for the decommissioning funds, but the Member State is always the financier of last resort of any uncalculated risk or insolvency and bankruptcy of the operator. The state is, as well, the financier of last resort of any accident or uncalculated risk.

Decommissioning costs are part of the electricity production costs. The amount of the yearly funding, the applied calculation and discount rates, and the requirement as to when and how decommissioning takes place must be factored into production costs.

Operators may use either company resources or contributions to externally managed funds. Adequate financial resources for the future decommissioning of nuclear installations must be secured throughout their generating lifetime no matter what type of management scheme is chosen. Transparency on the use of financial resources is needed.

The financing of the decommissioning fund in the Member States must be in line with Community competition laws. The decommissioning funds may be used by the operator for investments, either in their existing facilities or market acquisitions thus risking distortions in the internal market.

Some Member Countries oppose the Commission´s draft Directive because of the conflict it creates with their own decommissioning funds for their operators.

The rapporteur of the ITRE Committee on the Nuclear Safety Directive makes the following conclusions and proposes the Commission Proposal to be rejected:

1.The Commission says that the draft directive on nuclear safety is not a framework directive and that it is not preparing any other directives based on it.

2. Nevertheless, the Commission intends to use the directive to create standards based on "best practices" with which Member States will be required to comply.

3. It is in this way that Commission seeks to expand its competence in the area of nuclear safety and acquire responsibility without basing its recommendations and requirements on valid legislation. However, the adoption of standards will put enormous pressure on the competent authorities in the Member States.

4. The legal base for these non-binding standards remains unclear.

5. The Commission does not seem to know what resources it has at its disposal for handling the inspection reports and the accounts based on those reports.

6. The Commission does not seem to be aware how many of its own personnel are following and monitoring issues related to nuclear safety and has no idea of its personnel needs in future.

7. Therefore, it follows that the financial statement attached to the Commission's proposal is not credible.

8. The level of nuclear safety in the Accession countries is largely the same as in current EU Member States. Therefore, it is not necessary for the new directive to take effect before these countries join the Union.

9. There are different views among the Institutions about the legal base for this proposal and the Commission has been unable to convince the rapporteur of the validity of the legal base it has chosen.

10. It was the Parliament´s wish to have the directive on the nuclear safety drafted, but this proposal does not lead to the establishment of common, more demanding and legally binding nuclear safety standards. Therefore, the Reporter of the Committee concludes that this draft Directive will not increase nuclear safety across an enlarged EU.