NIGD Working Paper 2/2002
Heikki Patomäki, Teivo Teivainen, with Mika Rönkkö
Summary
TABLE
1 TABLE
2 TABLE3
TABLE 4
Contents (Final version of the report available soon at: http://www.nigd.u-net.com/publications )
Preface
List of abbreviations
Introduction
1. The United Nations system.
2. The Bretton Woods
institutions.
3. The World Trade Organisation.
4.
International courts.
5. Conclusion
6. Empowering global civil society.
7. Truth Commission.
8.
World Parliament and referenda.
9. Debt arbitration
mechanism.
10. Global tax organisations.
11. Conclusion
12. Conservative
vs. transformative proposals
13. Conclusion:
an outline of a strategy of global democratic change
List of references
* * *
Democracy is an open-ended process that is produced by actors but not under the circumstances of their own making. Global Democracy Initiatives examines the major global democracy initiatives: how are they justified; who supports them; are they politically possible and feasible; what are their transformative effects? On this basis it develops a systematic strategy for global democratisation in the early 2000s.
The first part scrutinises the transformative possibilities of the existing institutional arrangements, particularly the UN system; the Bretton Woods institutions; the WTO; and the international courts. The second part discusses the potential of creating new institutional arrangements. These initiatives include a North-South truth commission; a world parliament; empowering global civil society; a debt arbitration mechanism; and global tax organisations.
Because of their decision-making structures and the dual hegemony of the US and neoliberalism, the UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions are more or less hopeless as immediate objects of reforms. The international courts seem to evolve on their own, and at any rate, they are only elements in the wider background context. Despite its rapidly expanding scope and powers, the WTO seems to be the existing multilateral arrangement that is most susceptible to democratic change. The one country/one vote principle on which it is in principle – although not in practice – based makes changes possible, however difficult. Reforms should focus, primarily, on reducing and redefining the scope of the WTO and, secondarily, on democratising its preparatory process, decision-making procedures and dispute settlement mechanisms.
Of the possible new institutional arrangements, a global truth commission and world parliament are interesting but ambiguous possibilities. Both need time to evolve into mature initiatives, and the social conditions for a global parliament in the currently prevalent senses do not exist (the latter claim could, however, be partially tested by means of a global proto-referendum).
Besides empowering global civil society, the establishment of a debt arbitration mechanism and global taxes – and the currency transactions tax in particular – emerge as the most prominent possibilities. Since many crucial mechanisms of power in the global political economy are based on financial dependency, both the creation of a debt arbitration mechanism and the CTT would make a major difference. They would relieve the dominance of global finance over states, the rule of law and democratic politics. Simultaneously, they would create new and more enabling sources for financing development and other priorities.
Although a well-designed strategy of global democratisation has to
focus on particular areas and exclude some possibilities, it is
crucial to see the links and connections between different reforms.
Reforms should reinforce each other and, moreover, by changing the
world historical context, create opportunities for further reforms.
It is also important that any new institutional arrangement is, and
will remain, open to all relevant participants, and that the new
systems of global governance are actually devised to encourage the
momentary outsiders to join them. Democratic world politics must be
simultaneously non-exclusionary and leave space for exit options and
opt-out mechanisms.
This book discusses the most important multilateral institutional arrangements of the contemporary world as well as a number of major initiatives for new ones. It conceives democracy as an open-ended process that is produced by actors but not under the circumstances of their own making. On this basis, it develops a systematic strategy for global democratisation in the early 2000s.
The idea of this book was born in April-August 2001, when, following an invitation for tenders for a project entitled "International co-operation and democracy" by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, we developed a research proposal and made an offer for this grant.
In August 2001, Heikki Patomäki wrote the conceptual framework for the project, which now forms the core of the introduction and also structures the argument of the book. In September 2001, Mika Rönkkö was hired as a full-time researcher for five months, until the end of January 2002. He collected material; made interviews in Helsinki and New York as well as via Internet; and prepared a background text comprising notes, summaries and part-developed ideas.
On the basis of the material provided by Rönkkö, and by drawing on a number of earlier and on-going research projects on this theme, Patomäki and Teivo Teivainen put together this book between February and early May 2002.
Parts I and III have been mostly written by Patomäki, except for the chapter on international courts, which was authored by Teivainen. Part II is more or less co-authored, particularly the chapters on global civil society and debt arbitration mechanism. Chapter on truth commission was mostly prepared by Teivainen, while Patomäki has been responsible for the one on global tax organisations. Finally, Teivainen prepared the first full version of the chapter on world parliament and global referenda. After discussions, it was decided that Patomäki rewrite some parts of this chapter.
Although we do not agree on everything, every part of this book has been jointly finalised and is thus signed by both of us (and also by Rönkkö).
We would also like to Phoebe Moore for providing research assistance and in particular helping with the very intensive period of final editing of the manuscipt; Katarina Sehm Patomäki for selecting and organising the highlighted sentences and also for helping to finalise the text; Lois Webb for designing the cover; and Teemu Matinpuro for preparing the design and outlook and, equally importantly, for his patience when we exceeded the deadline of an already very tight schedule.
It should also be mentioned that this book has a sister, namely "From a Global Market Place to Political Spaces - The North-South Dialogue Continues", a book edited by Katarina Sehm-Patomäki and Leena Rikkilä, NIGD Working Paper 1/2002. It is a similar exercise, based on the evaluations of global democracy initiatives by five Southern think tanks.
In Helsinki, 8 May 2002,
Heikki Patomäki
Democracy has been developing into a near-universal norm. According to a widely shared conception, every nation-state should establish regular multi-party elections, which determine the government of the country. Also 'participation' and 'civil society' have become key words in the policy documents of most international organisations. People should have not only the power to choose their government but also to participate in some of the processes that affect them.
Simultaneously it is claimed that globalisation affects everyone. Nobody should turn her or his back to the effects of this grand-scale process, which appears to be homogenising and uniting the world. Thus the question arises: should the norms of democracy be applied to globalisation? Even if global governance may have no government, should people have a right to choose their governors and participate in and shape the relevant social processes?
When David Held began to write on the notion of cosmopolitan democracy at the turn of the 1990s, only a handful of fellow scholars took him seriously. Ten years later, multiple conferences and seminars are being organised every year on this problematic, also by governments and international organisations. Many parts of global civil society are now arguing for democratising global governance and pluralizing possibilities for democratic will-formation. The Southern movements and states may feel increasingly powerless in the face of the 'empire' of globalisation, yet now they may have found new allies in their post-colonial struggle for a more equitable world.
Global democracy is thus emerging as the key political issue of
our times. It is certainly not a goal shared by everyone. While some
would prefer the status quo, many insist on the primacy of local or
national. Is global democracy justified? If it is justified, on what
grounds? What kinds of global democracy initiatives have come to the
fore? On what conceptions of democracy are these initiatives based?
Is there any significant - actual or potential - political support
for them? Are the proposals feasible? Are these proposals
institutionally conservative, or do they aim at transforming relevant
background contexts? Our study addresses these questions.
Not all proposals to reform international institutional arrangements are global democracy initiatives. Two criteria have to be fulfilled: (i) the reform proposal has to be global and (ii) it has to be articulated, at least in essential part, in terms of democracy. Thus in this study we exclude national or regional initiatives; and reform proposals that have little if anything to do with democracy as such.
There is nonetheless a large number of proposals to democratise existing global institutions or, alternatively, to create new ones. Often there are certain 'family resemblances' between different proposals or initiatives. A set of proposals may be seen as variations of the one and the same theme in a number of ways. These proposals may deal with a given cluster of institutions or organisations such as the United Nations system or the Bretton Woods institutions. They may aim at establishing a representative centre of global politics - a world parliament - although the definitions of the preferred institutional arrangements vary. The proposals may imply a global system of taxation, although ideas about what should be taxed, why and how are often very different. There are also other kinds of proposals about raising funds for various global purposes, some of them justified also in terms of global democracy. Last but not least, the global democracy initiatives may also focus on empowering global civil society, perhaps even giving it a role in global agenda setting and decision-making. However, the differences between institutionally conservative and transformative civil society proposals are often enormous.
It is not easy to categorise different global democracy initiatives. The scope and depth of proposals differ a lot. Sometimes there is also an important difference between short-term and longer-term aims. Whatever the categorisation, many concrete proposals include features of more than one category.
Perhaps the easiest way to categorise
the existing proposals is in terms of their attitude towards existing
institutional arrangements. On the one hand, there are proposals that
aim at reforming existing institutions and organisations, without
changing them fundamentally. On the other hand, there are initiatives
that imply deeper changes of the global context, perhaps also through
the establishment of entirely new institutional arrangements and
organisations.
Thus there are dozens of proposals about reforming parts or whole of the UN system, without altering the fundamental idea of the UN. There are numerous initiatives to revise some of the rules and principles of the Bretton Woods institutions or the World Trade Organisation, WTO. Moreover, it is equally common to advocate reforms of, say, various security, human rights or environmental regimes.
Examples of proposed new
institutional arrangements would include a global truth commission; a
currency transactions tax organisation; and a world parliament. To
what extent would these new organisations revise the relevant global
contexts? It depends on the concrete details of the proposal. Some
new organisations would seem to be meant to be merely symbolic.
Thorough reforms of existing organisations would often appear to have
much more transformative capacity. On the other hand, some plans for
new institutional arrangements are innovative and would democratise
some of the relevant contexts quite thoroughly.
Every initiative for global democracy presupposes a theory of democracy. What does it mean to say that actors themselves should rule? What would democratic equality and will-formation mean in a global context?
Democracy is best conceived as a process of democratisation. There is no model that would exhaust all democratic possibilities; and without any movement towards further democratisation, strong tendencies to corruption and degeneration can easily take over - within a supposedly stable state of democracy.
An important traditional distinction is that between representative and participatory democracy. The problems with representation are manifold. Who is supposed to represent whom or what? Literally, representation means to re-present, to make something, which is absent somewhere, present. Periodical elections within a given set of franchised actors is only one possible solution to the problems of re-presentation. Another would be a constant process of will-formation within various smaller groups or organs or councils or whatever, which would send a representative to higher level meetings to make their opinions count in the decision-making process. But how representative would these smaller groups be?
Those suspicious of the practices of re-presentation argue for participatory democracy. But who should participate where and on what terms? There are a number of possibilities here as well. A simple liberalist solution is to demand that all major decisions should be taken by direct votes (referenda). Many republicans would see this as encouraging further atomism, which undermines the basis of participatory democracy: pluralist action and speech in a shared public space. According to these conceptions, the essential problem is to build shared public spaces for democratic will-formation.
John Dryzek has argued that there are at least three different criteria to identify democratisation (1):
1. Franchise, i.e. the number of participants in any political setting.
2. Scope, i.e. the domains of life and social relations under democratic control.
3. Authenticity, i.e. the degree to which democratic control is substantive rather than symbolic, informed rather than ignorant, and competently engaged.
It is important to add also a fourth criterion, concerning the self-delimitation of democratic political action (2)
4. The self-binding of democracy, i.e. a democracy should not be allowed to destroy democratic practices and procedures of non-violent disagreement and conflict resolution; and a majority should not be allowed to destroy its own learning capacities or to deny others' voice and equal access to the decision-making positions.
Furthermore, in international, transnational, regional and global contexts it is also important to determine the actors. There are three main answers: (i) states, re-presenting people within the boundaries of a nation-state; (ii) self-organised political actors of global civil society; and/or (iii) people (citizens of an imagined cosmopolis).
These answers imply different responses to the problems of
representation and participation, as well as different views on the
meaning and importance of the criteria of democratisation. Of course,
they also imply different accounts about the real practices and power
mechanisms of the world we are living in.
What is the value of democracy? And more concretely, how are specific global reform proposals justified? Basically, there are (i) political arguments for democracy; and (ii) arguments that say that democracy is good because it tends to bring about other valued outcomes, such as peace, economic efficiency, distributive justice or ecological care.
Political arguments say that democracy is the best or most justified way to organise political life because of the nature of political beings and life. For instance, epistemologically, we can't trust anybody to know a priori better than others. Without free speech and everybody's equal access to will-formation, a community may be led astray. There is also the spectre of a vicious circle of the accumulation of power in the hands of powerful actors or groups, just because they are powerful. The end-result may be a repressive and violent tyranny (particularly given the potential powers of modern organisations).
A more positive argument would be based on an ontological analysis of human possibilities. Hannah Arendt for instance argues that political action and speech - which are by definition pluralist - constitute higher forms of human existence than a mere satisfaction of physical needs, or technical work for the production of material goods to satisfy those physical needs. In public political space, human beings recognise each other as free actors, capable of exposing and developing their identities; demonstrating their virtues; and creating something new. (3)
The value of democracy can also be explicated in terms of peace, efficiency, justice or ecological care. Democracy is thus envisaged as means to an end. For instance, the argument may be that democracy provides a peaceful way to resolve domestic conflicts - and the criterion (4) is meant, in part, to reinforce this. Many in International Relations argue further that liberal-democratic states do not fight each other. In contrast, Alan Gilbert points out that states following the rule of election-based competition between elites in capitalist market society have also often been war- and violence-prone. (4) Bottom-up democratic internationalism has provided an important counter-veiling power to these tendencies, setting a common good against 'democratic' imperialism.
Similar differences can be found within arguments that see democracy as a means to efficiency, justice or ecological care. For the Western orthodoxy, the starting point is competitive elitist vision of liberal democracy ('capitalist oligarchy'). Often these thinkers hold that there is a strong positive correlation between this model and achieving another good, say X. Empirical and theoretical criticism of these alleged correlations is sometimes reactionary. But also radical democrats argue that these correlations are non-existent (not supported by evidence); artificial (mere results of data-coding procedures); or over-determined (due to many other contextual factors than mere liberal-democratic institutions of nation-states). In the view of radical democrats, however, a more genuine, deeper democracy would in fact bear the promise of delivering X (peace, welfare, justice, ecological care).
Any of these arguments for democracy can provide justification for a concrete democratic reform. In addition, however, a case for a concrete reform proposal may stem from more specific geo-historical considerations, such as failure of a particular authoritarian model in a particular country or field of social activity; or from a lesson that in pluralist contexts the only arrangement that works, without threatening anybody, is based on particular democratic procedures.
Last but not least, democratic reforms can also be a means for a group or collectivity to gain a voice in political will-formation. If generalised, this individualistic demand implies a moral argument for democratic self-determination of all connected selves.
It is obviously difficult to make an assessment of any particular
initiative without taking a stand on these complex issues. The first
step of analysis is to understand the reasons behind a proposal. The
second step is to assess the validity of the implied claims.
It is equally important to analyse and assess actual and potential political support for a reform proposal. Global democracy initiatives can be the result of the work of a few isolated individuals. From the outset, they may as well be developed within movements or organisations that already constitute strong actual support for the initiative.
There are other important
distinctions. Independent- of actual support right
now, it may be reasonable to expect an initiative to be supported by
a number of significant actors. It is thus crucial whether reform
proposals are based on a realistic analysis of political
possibilities.
Blueprints for the future may be visionary, but they may also be indicators of mistaken optimism. A romantic intellectual may be trying to find ground for her or his high ideals, and thus starts to believe that the many aspects of the ideal are already actual.
Instead of well-intending illusions, there has to be a careful analysis of the world historical context of political action. This analysis has to take into account the relevant rules, resources, actor-identities, structures and mechanisms. What kinds of social forces could be expected to support a change? What would the feedback and possibly cumulative effects of a reform be? Are there any indications of a potential backlash against the reform? What new possibilities would be opened up by this particular reform?
The fact that history is open
provides both hope for emancipatory change and tends to undermine any
attempt to envisage a closed model for cosmopolitan democracy.
Initiatives should thus be assessed also in terms of their implicit
philosophy of history. Do they enable further democratic emancipation
in the long run; or do they attempt to force world history into a
strait-jacket of actual or potential 'end of history'?
Some of the reform proposals are conservative and exclusive. They take the existing institutional arrangements and social and technical division of labour for granted. Institutional conservativism leads each group to identify its interests and ideals with the defence of its particular niche. (5)
Thus the developmental NGOs or international organisations may advocate reforms that would merely yield more funds to their already existing activities. They would also like to have a stronger voice in international fora to realise their basic aim more effectively. Southern states may push for reforms that would gain them better access to the Western markets, or stabilise and raise the price of raw materials they are exporting, or defend their right to decide upon the use of child labour. They would also like to have a better position in multilateral economic institutions in order to defend these established interests more effectively. Many Northern states - and related business interests - would perhaps be most content with symbolic rather than real reforms, for symbolic reforms would yield legitimacy to current policies and practices while avoiding any real challenge to the existing institutional framework.
Other approaches are transformative and solidaristic. They propose ways of realising the interests and ideals through the step-by-step change of a set of arrangements. (6) For instance, a currency transactions tax organisation (CTTO), if organised innovatively and democratically, could perhaps strengthen the autonomy of states to decide upon their monetary policy, and also provide them with a part of the tax revenues; give Southern states the majority of votes in deciding upon the management of the tax and preparing the budget of the global fund; while also giving global civil society a powerful voice in influencing the use of substantial global funds e.g. for developmental purposes. CTTO would also create a new forum for democratic associations in world politics - albeit initially confined to regulating and transforming an aspect of global financial markets - and thereby enable the development of new political alliances and thereby further realistic initiatives.
It is important to analyse whether a global democracy initiative
is based on an institutionally
conservative idea of 'piecemeal social engineering', or whether it
aims at institutional change. At the face
value, institutional conservativism may appear more 'realistic'. This
may be an illusion, however. Institutional innovations may overcome
the politics of compromises between narrow and short-sighted group
interests. This is something that cannot be decided a priori,
but has to be analysed concretely and in a detailed manner, case by
case.
The world has more possibilities for democratic changes than traditional accounts of global politics admit. Yet, not everything is possible, now nor later. Therefore, the feasibility of the proposed new institutional arrangement has to be carefully assessed. What are the intended effects on democratisation (given the four criteria) and on other relevant values? Would these effects be significant? Would the proposed arrangement really work as intended - or at all?
The realisation of a reform involves, first of all, practical wisdom. It also involves lessons drawn from past or contemporary models and counterfactual reasoning about the possible effects of an altered context. Thought-experiments about the consequences of the transformed practices and systems also play an important role in realistic plans for social change. (7)
In any given geo-historical context, there are limits to programmatic institutional imagination. But by changing parts, or the nature, of the wider context, new 'concrete utopias' may well become possible.
A concrete utopia can remedy some problems while generating others. The new problems could even be worse than the old ones. A realist global democracy initiative cannot assume that any idea or concept can construct any social realities. To the contrary, it is necessary to study the viability of concrete utopias by all available means. In any given geo-historical context, there are limits to programmatic institutional imagination. But by changing parts, or the nature, of the wider context, new 'concrete utopias' may well become possible.
Hence, when a democracy initiative is
assessed, it has first to be checked whether there is any feasibility
analysis. How plausible is that analysis? If there is no feasibility
analysis, it has to be created.
A global democracy initiative may be institutionally conservative or transformative. There are different theories of democracy on which any proposal may be based. A global democracy initiative may or may not lack grounding in terms of its normative justification; political support; and/or feasibility. It is essential that all these will be scrutinised carefully.
What is the vision of politics and theory of democracy? Is a particular proposal institutionally conservative or transformative? What exactly is the justification for the suggested reform? How does the proposal tackle the problem of, say, representation? What is the envisaged political support for this proposal; and the strategy to make it real? Is the proposed arrangement itself feasible? Is it conceived as a step in a process or as an end in itself?
Ultimately, there can never be any absolute guarantee about the prospects of a reform. Nonetheless, the failure or success of any serious attempt at a democratic change depends also on rigorous preparations for it. Meticulous assessment of its basis is an essential part of those preparations.
In the following, we shall use this framework to assess a variety of global democracy initiatives. It is conventional to start with UN reforms. The UN is, after all, the only truly universal global political organisation. There is a huge literature on the UN reforms. The point is not to tackle all parts and aspects of this literature. Rather, in the first section of Part I, we aim at assessing the main categories of reform proposals that aim at democratising (parts of) the UN system.
The initial plan of placing the UN, and the UN ECOSOC in particular, at the centre of the emerging system of international organizations was realized only in letter, never in practice.
Originally, the UN was placed at the apex of the emerging system of international organisations, including the Bretton Woods institutions. The Security Council was given powers to tackle issues of peace and security, whereas the General Assembly was devised as the democratic heart of the UN system. In this report, we also discuss proposals to establish a new UN People's Assembly.
Moreover, the Economic and Social Council, ECOSOC, was supposed to be the core of the system of social and economic organisations. This plan was realised in letter, but never in practice. Gradually, the IMF and the World Bank have simultaneously assumed new powers and imposed orthodox economic policies on most states of the planet. They have even been invoked to monitor the UN system (rather than the other way around). Hence the Bretton Woods institutions have become key points in the contestation over global governance (8).
Besides the IMF and the World Bank, the 1944 Bretton Woods conference intended to found an International Trade Organisation (ITO). The ITO was never realised because of the opposition of the US Congress. A General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was originally meant to be a temporary arrangement only. It was eventually replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was created through the final agreements that ended the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. It came into being on 1 January 1995. The WTO has radically expanded the area covered by laissez faire 'free trade' principles. The WTO hosts high profile intergovernmental meetings every two years. These meetings have become spots of conflicts between both groupings of states, on the one hand, and the WTO and critical social movements, on the other. No wonder many global democracy initiatives concern the restructuration (or replacement) of the WTO. Finally, we shall analyse the implications for global democracy of the changes in the system of international courts, especially the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. These institutions can best be seen as part of the wider background context.
In Part II of this report, we tackle schemes for novel institutional arrangements. We start Part II by discussing the rise of global civil society. This is a heterogeneous political force that is opening up new political possibilities. A vision of institutionalising and enhancing the role of the World Social Forum provides the most important example of initiatives to empower global civil society.
The basic idea of a global truth commission, discussed in the following chapter, is to build a forum, in which past and present injustices could be discussed in a democratic manner. One of the aims would be to reconcile the existing differences of feelings and interpretations.
Next we assess various initiatives for a World Parliament and global referenda. Some of them are merely symbolic; others would grant also real powers to a central global representative body. We will then briefly analyse global referendum proposals and assess to what extent this kind of direct democracy is possible in tomorrow's world.
Debt-dependence is a key power mechanism in the contemporary global political economy. Proposals for a debt arbitration mechanism are among the crucial initiatives to further global democratisation. They would also imply drastic debt reductions.
There are a number of proposals for
global taxes, and a few initiatives for global tax organisations. Not
all arguments for them are made in terms of democracy; but many are.
At best, these exemplify transformative institutional possibilities.
5.0 See Unger 1998: 11-12; 44-48; 109; 164-169.