hCa mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina
28 February - 6 March 1996
Report
SUMMARY
The purpose of this mission was fourfold:
1. To assess the refugee situation. One of the central issues of the
Dayton agreement
is the return of refugees and displaced people. "The early return
of refugees and
displaced persons is an important objective of the settlement of
the conflict in Bosnia
and Herzegovina." (Annex 7, art.1, sub 1). The hCa is in touch
with refugees and
displaced persons, from all sides and is working for a smooth and
peaceful return of
these people, wherever possible.
The biggest problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the reality of
some 2.2 million
refugees and displaced persons, i.e. half of the total
population. Since the nationalist
(ruling) parties are first and foremost concerned with increasing
their power on the
territory under their control, be it as a result of the
Washington agreement of 1994
or the Dayton-agreement of 1995, refugees and displaced persons
are constantly
manipulated for political reasons. The reality shows that neither
the Serb Entity nor
the Croatian controlled Herzeg-Bosna is willing to allow
Muslim-refugees to return
home. Also, a return of displaced persons between the Entities
(Republika Srpska and
the Federation) is politically obstructed. Instead, more and more
people are becoming
refugees. Given this reality it is inhuman not to allow refugees
and displaced persons
to settle permanently in those parts of the country where they
are at the moment. The
argument that this would mean an implicit contribution to ethnic
cleansing is cynical,
under such circumstances, and could lead to a dangerous
radicalisation of the refugee
population.
One of the underlying problems is the fragmented nature of the
International
Community. IFOR only clears minefields that represents a threat
to its own personnel.
It is completely unacceptable that minefields are not also
cleared so as to prepare the
return of (part of the) refugees to the frontline-areas. It gives
the impression that the
International Community is deliberately trying to broaden the
zone of separation to
prevent any contact between people from different national
backgrounds. The Dayton-
agreement envisaged that the return of refugees would be underway
at the time of
elections (summer '96). Nothing has been done to make thishappen; i.e., to provide
a secure environment and protection for those who are willing to
go home. No
concerted plan whatsoever has been prepared by IFOR, UNHCR and
OSCE.
'Lipservice' is the main contribution of the International
Community to the issue of
the return of refugees and displaced persons. The treatment of
the Srebrenica-refugees
is just one among several other examples how powerless and
traumatized people are
manipulated (by the Parties in particular). Enormous numbers of
refugees and
displaced persons have been sent to Brcko for political reasons,
in order to create an
explosive situation around the Posavina corridor which will
prevent any peaceful
settlement over this (still) disputed piece of land.
2. To strengthen our hCa-offices in Sarajevo and Tuzla and to extend
our hCa-network
into Republica Srpska, by creating local branches in Banja Luka
and Brcko. This
network is seen as an important instrument to stimulate and
promote the reintegration
of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the level of civil society. The
Tuzla Citizens Forum
and Circle 99 from Sarajevo, the main partners of the hCa in the
country, are
working on the establishment of a Citizens Parliament in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
The Citizens Parliament should become a regular meetingplace
where NGO's can
discuss their contribution to the democratic reintegration of the
country. The hCa will
function as an international umbrella for the Citizens
Parliament.
The only organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina that are really
trying to re-unite
the country in a peaceful way, are non-nationalistic opposition
parties and civic
groups. One of the most positive developments is the increase in
such organizations,
both in the Federation and Republika Srpska. There is more space
for pluralistic
developments now, also because the ruling authorities are
divided. The hCa-
international tries to support democratic alternatives, for
instance by helping to create
networks of civic groups throughout the whole country.
Unfortunately, they receive
very little support from the official International Community.
The Dayton-agreement
has effectively marginalized them and has put almost all
international eggs (political
consultation and cooperation, material support) in the basket of
the nationalist
Parties. Independent media (nation-wide), independent education
programs all over
the country in preparation for the elections, etc., are not
supported so far, let alone
initiated by the International Community. The civic forces are
also seriously trying
to develop political solutions and alternatives for the mostthreatening spots in the
country. They propose, for example, the urgent establishment of
an international
protectorate for the Posavina corridor around Brcko, in order to
prevent the outburst
of a new war. But the International Community seems to prefer a
'wait and see'
policy.
3. To push for free and fair elections. The forthcoming elections in
Bosnia and
Herzegovina are of crucial importance, both for the development
of democracy and
the process of reintegration. "The Parties shall ensure that
conditions exist for the
organization of free and fair elections, in particular a
politically neutral environment;
shall protect and enforce the right to vote in secret without
fear or intimidation; shall
ensure freedom of expression and of the press; shall allow and
encourage freedom of
association (including of political parties); and shall ensure
freedom of movement."
(Annex 3, art.1, sub 1). "The Parties request the OSCE to certify
whether elections
can be effective under current social conditions in both Entities
and, if necessary, to
provide assistance to the Parties in creating these conditions."
(Annex 3, art.1, sub
2).
The hCa has formulated a set of criteria which among other things
should be met in
order to guarantee free and fair elections. These include:
a) Elections should be delayed until free movement is secured
and a substantial
number of refugees and displaced persons who wish to return
home have been
able to do so.
b) All candidates should be screened by the Election
Commission, so that none
who have been indicted by the International War Crimes
Tribunal may stand.
c) No party with ethnic or religious criteria for membership
should be allowed
to participate.
d) Serving military or police personnel should be barred from
standing as
candidates.
e) The Election Commission must establish offices in every town
and large
village where citizens can lodge complaints against
candidates and parties.
The elections are considered crucial for the development of a
democratic society (and
mentality) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The overall feeling among
the International
Community is that the elections will produce a more stable and
democratically
legitimated environment. This might come true, but only if the
conditions for free and
fair elections are met. The Dayton-agreement spells out many of
these conditions, but
at the same time it has put a deadline for the election-datewhich might not be
crossed. Before 14th September the elections have to take place,
no matter whether
the ruling Parties fulfil the conditions or frustrate the
situation. This ambiguity in the
Dayton-agreement invites the Parties to draw their own line and
make it sure that the
outcome of the elections is predictable and consolidates their
power. It's obvious that
the elections will be and are already manipulated by the ruling
Parties, especially
now, in the months before they will take place. Moreover, it is
embarrassing to see
how the International Community is becoming a pawn of these
games. Thresholds are
raised - n.b.: by the OSCE-ambassador himself! - to prevent the
non-nationalist
parties from participating in the elections. Money on
reconstruction, provided by
governments and intergovernmental organizations, is spent via the
Parties
(nationalists) and in such a way as to convince the electorate
that more benefits will
arrive if and only if the nationalists remain in power. If, after
the elections, the
country is paralysed by a threefold nationalistic victory, and
finally falls apart, then
the International Community can be easily accused of complicity
in that tragedy.
4. To monitor the role of the international community, represented
by IFOR, UNHCR,
OSCE, ECMM, the High Representative, and other
(inter)governmental bodies.
During the war the hCa has advocated to strengthen the authority
of international
bodies. Above all, Bosnia and Herzegovina lacks a strong
legitimate central authority,
able to enforce decisions whenever necessary. The international
community is the
only institution that can offer such authority, if the political
will exists. However, the
concern with mission creep, so often expressed by representatives
of various bodies,
and the fragmentation of responsibilities have made us doubtful
about the readiness
and capability of the international community to cope with such a
challenge.
The International Community runs the risk that it will be seen by
the population as
once again unable to fulfil its promises, and by the Parties as
an easy tool for
manipulation. We came across various cases which were disturbing.
During our stay
there was a meeting in Banja Luka of the High Representative (Mr.
Bildt) and the
premiers of the Federation and Republica Srpska. The radio in
Sarajevo commented
on this meeting and told its listeners that Mr. Karadzic was also
seen in Banja Luka
in the vicinity of the meeting place. Of course, he was not
arrested. Even worse,
Mr. Bildt seemed unable to do anything to cope with this
embarrassing situation. At
the office of the High Representative we were told that Mr.Karadzic appearance in
Banja Luka could not be verified with complete certainty, because
he and his driver
are alike as two peas. One can imagine how ordinary people in
Sarajevo and else-
where react by hearing such an excuse. In Banja Luka we were told
that Karadzic
had been seen the other day, sitting in a restaurant, while at an
other table two IFOR
commanders were having their meal. IFOR confirmed this incident
later to us, apolo-
gizing for doing nothing. But it did not belong to their mandate,
they said. These
events do not raise the status of IFOR. Nor does the fact that
IFOR is not allowed to
clear all the minefields and (thereby) help the refugees to
return to their homes.
Indeed, displaced people and refugees must get the feeling that
the international
community deliberately stops them from returning to their
original places. The
UNHCR is also telling the refugees that it doesn't have the power
to enforce such a
move which was foreseen in the Dayton agreement.
The military part of the Dayton agreement, i.e. the separation of
forces, is the most
successful part so far. But if it remains the only success, it
probably will not last very
long. The civic component of Dayton is still in a critical stage.
There is a lack of
money and priorities are not established. Almost everyone
understands that education
(in democracy) is key at the present moment, but there is no
money available for that
purpose. The elections are coming up in a couple of months and
still the media are
not free, the non-nationalist parties are marginalized, and
ordinary people are faced
with war-propaganda and prevented from making fair and free
choices. The OSCE
is manipulated by the Parties as the first election paper of the
ambassador has clearly
shown. But it seems that elections must take place this summer,
no matter how fair
and free they will be.
Recommendations
1. Time, energy and money of both the international community and
NGO's, should be
invested in strengthening the non-nationalistic option - opposition
parties and (networks
of) civic initiatives - in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Indeed, these
are the main forces
working for re-integration and (liberal) democracy in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. So far,
they are neglected by the International Community, which almost
exclusively pays
homage to the nationalist Parties (as demanded by the
Dayton-agreement).
2. A really independent nation-wide television-network should be
initiated on short notice.
In this way, the existing imbalance between ruling nationalists andthe non-nationalist
organizations can be changed for the better. Other independent
media-initiatives should
be supported as well.
3. The Posavina corridor around Brcko urgently needs a strong
international protectorate.
Tensions are growing day after day, due to a piling up of refugees
on both sides of the
demarcation line. The nationalist Parties are incapable and
unprepared to solve the
Corridor-problem themselves. The international attitude of 'wait
and see' should be
changed immediately.
4. Opposition parties and NGO's should be included in the negotiations
about the election
rules and regulations, in order to prevent nationalist parties from
controlling and
manipulating the (outcome of the) elections. All parties and NGO's
should get equal
possibilities to address the huge number of refugees abroad, who
are a decisive factor
in the upcoming elections.
5. Displaced persons and refugees need respect, and should not be
politically instrumenta-
lized. Different categories should be introduced. Category 1.: the
refugees/displaced
persons from the front-line (regions), who had to be removed
because of the fighting.
They should return to their (repaired) homes as soon as possible.
Category 2.: the
refugees/displaced persons who were removed during ethnic cleansing
campaigns. They
should not be forced to go back to their place of origin, and
instead be offered a
permanent stay in the place where they live now.
6. OSCE-Ambassador Frowick, head of the Provisional Election
Committee, should state
that the agreed time-table cannot be met. Moreover, every area
should be considered
on its own merits. Indeed, the political situation, and the
democratic atmosphere, varies
considerably from city to city, area to area, and between the two
Entities. Local and
Cantonal, Entity and National elections should only be held if the
current situation
allows it.
7. NGO's should invest much more in setting up education programmes,
on the elections,
on local democracy, on individual, civil and human rights, on the
mechanisms of
propaganda and political campaigning, etc. Up to now, almost all
energy and money is
put in humanitarian and material assistance. But a society can not
live by bread alone.
8. Pressure should be put on the Croatian government to accept the
return of refugees to
Krajina. This would improve the possibility for Muslim and Croat
refugees to return to
their homes in the Serbian Entity.
9. The international community should interpret it's mandate less
narrowly. IFOR should
deliberately try to arrest war-criminals. IFOR should assist in
clearing minefields,
everywhere. Other international organizations like Bildt's office,
the OSCE, the High
Representative and the UNHCR should exert pressure on (local)
authorities to accept the
rules (of law) and to fulfil the conditions for free and fair
elections. IFOR or the UN
police force should take responsibility for internal security.
(The full report is available on request. Please, contact mrs. Juanita
Zeegelaar, hCa-office,
The Hague, tel. **/31/70/3555444, fax **/31/70/3555199.)