From M.H.Kaldor@sussex.ac.ukSat Mar 23 18:14:11 1996
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 1996 16:04:42 +0000
From: Mary Kaldor 
To: hca-list@zamir-zg.ztn.apc.org
Subject: Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina

I enclose an article I have written for the New Statesman. I hope you will find it useful. Feel free to use in any way you want.

Best Wishes

Mary Kaldor

Dayton after three months

Bosnia-Herzegovina to-day is a divided and fragmented society. It is not only the division between the two "entities" specified in the Dayton agreement - Republica Srbska and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina - or even the division between the Croat and Muslim parts of the federation. Within each of these different areas, there are huge variations in every town and village; only contrast the situation in Tuzla or Zenica, where the situation seems to be improving in social and humanitarian terms, with the unbearable tensions, of widely differing character, that persist in places like Mostar, Sarajevo, Banja Luka or Brcko. Along with these geographical differences, it is possible to identify a growing political fragmentation. In both Republika Srbska and the Bosnian-controlled parts of the Federation, the ruling nationalists are no longer as monolithic as before: in Republika Srbska, Karadzic's SDS (the Serb nationalist party) and its ally the Serb Radical Party are challenged by a left bloc consisting of Milosevic's party and the former JNA Communist Party; in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sziladzic has left the SDA (the Muslim nationalist party) and his new party (the Democratic Alternative) is wooing the Muslim clergy.

This geographical and political fragmentation leave space for the non-nationalist parties and for new civic movements. In the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Social Democrats and the Reformists (the Party of the Mayor of Tuzla) have formed an electoral pact and the Mayor of Tuzla is quietly confident of winning at least the Tuzla canton. In Republika Serbska, some leaders of the Liberal Party, in particular Dr Zhivanovic of Banja Luka, managed to survive the war with their integrity intact despite being mobilised and subjected to threats and privations of various kinds. Now the Party has restarted its independent newspaper, Novi Prelom, and its leaders believe that there are real possibilities to gain support from those who are horrified by the consequences of nationalism and, at the same time, still reject the Communist past.

Similar spaces seem to be opening up at a non-governmental level. New NGO's are being formed in Sarajevo especially among students. Circle 99 in Sarajevo the Citizens Forum of Tuzla, and the Helsinki Citizens Assembly plan to establish a Citizens Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina in April. In Banja Luka, a Serb Intellectual Forum was established last June with the aim of "changing the atmosphere and destroying the dominant thinking". Despite their prefix "Serb", which has been the subject of much controversy within the Forum, they are anxious to make links with similar groups in the Federation. Last week, a Helsinki Citizens Assembly branch was founded in Banja Luka; it aims to mobilise support among young people if possible from all communities, although only those that are old and sick tend to be left in the Croat and Muslim communities.

There are other kinds of initiatives as well, among refugees, womens organisations, lawyers, and so on. In some areas, more moderate authorities try to find their own local solutions. In Brcko, for example, talks were taking place, until very recently, between the Serb authorities who control the town and the neighbouring Federation authorities. The talks were mostly about concrete issues like water and electricity but they also touched on the exchange of refugees and indeed some refugee return has already been taking place.

These hopeful tendencies are, however, overshadowed by the continuing negative legacies of the war, which the international community seems to accept. Perhaps the most important problem is the refugees. This was a war about population displacement. In most parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, ethnic cleansing is almost complete. In Banja Luka, for example, out of 30,000 Croats and 30,000 Moslems, there are only 3000 Croats and 3000 Moslems left. All traces of their presence have been eliminated. Between April and September 1993, most of the Catholic Churches and all the Mosques were blown up with dynamite. The two famous sixteenth century mosques were blown up on Friday May 7 1993; on Monday, cleaning equipment was used to clear the rubble and grass over the area. Now you would never know that they had been there. Some two thirds of the original population of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been displaced from their homes. It is almost impossible to envisage any kind of normality until at least some refugees have been allowed to return, as promised under the Dayton agreement.

But this looks increasingly unlikely. Indeed the refugees, whether deliberately or not, are being instrumentalised by nationalists on both sides with the tacit connivance of the international community. Nothing was done to stop the exodus of Serbs from the suburbs of Sarajevo and nothing was done to insist that Croatia, too, must accept the return of Serb refugees from Krajina. As long as Serb refugees occupy the homes of Muslims and Croats in Republika Srbska, refugee return will be very difficult. In Banja Luka, for example, there are some 100,000 Serb refugees, including 35,000 from Krajina. Their arrival last summer prompted the last bout of ethnic cleansing from Banja Luka. In Brcko, where some 30,000 Moslems have left the town and some 7,000 were killed in concentration camps, the prospects for return which had seemed quite hopeful will be immensely complicated by the imminent arrival of 14,000 refugees from Sarajevo.(When we were there 650 had already arrived and were milling about the municipality building). Refugees from Sarajevo have also been sent to Srebrenica, Zvornik, Foca, and Visegrad.

At the same time, those refugees currently living in the federation face enormous difficulty in finding new homes. The government in Sarajevo is reluctant to build new settlements because this they say would accept the results of ethnic cleansing. And this position is supported by Western governments. Some funds are currently being invested in reconstruction of houses in the demilitarised separation zone; owners are given grants to rebuild their houses provided they agree to house refugees for a specified period of time. Unfortunately, this will only provide housing for a few hundred refugees and not together in their own homes. This inhuman instrumentalisation of those very people for whom the international community should feel most responsibility is creating a permanent source of dangerous tension. Now the Srebrenica refugees are talking about going to Sarajevo and seizing the homes of the departed Serbs.

The return of refugees is impossible to envisage without solving a second major legacy of the war - the continued atmosphere of fear. "FEAR" as the one of the few remaining Catholic priests in Banja Luka put it. "This town is dark, dirty, unhappy, cold, unfriendly, and inhuman." In all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the mafia are still in power, especially in Serb and Croat-held areas. People still get killed. There is still no freedom of movement except for those under the protection of the international community. War criminals still roam freely. Karadzic visited Banja Luka the same day as Bildt but nobody dared to arrest him. Two days earlier he was sighted at a restaurant in Banja Luka; at the next table were two IFOR commanders. The UN police force is unarmed and therefore reluctant to take serious measures to protect people or arrest criminals. IFOR is anxious to avoid what it calls "Mission Creep".

Non-Nationalist parties and groups hope that they can change this atmosphere especially after the elections which are scheduled for September. Robert Frowick, the OSCE Ambassador, has said he will not call the elections if the pre-conditions have not been fulfilled. These include freedom of movement, internal security, free media, etc. At present, the elections seem stacked in favour of the nationalist parties. First of all, no non-nationalist parties are represented on the election commission, which only includes the parties to the Dayton agreement. Although the OSCE can make additional appointments, this has not been done for the rather ingenuous argument that Frowick did not want too large a commission. Secondly, the recently published rules also favour the existing nationalist parties. Very large numbers of signatures are required to register party; this is almost impossible for the non-nationalist parties in some areas, e.g the Croat-controlled areas where HDZ acts as a one party system. (This rule was based on a first draft of the 1990 election procedures and was later modified. The nationalist parties who were present at the meeting of the election commission where this was discussed apparently did not reveal that this rule had later been modified).

The nationalist parties also retain control of the electronic media. There is one independent TV station, Studio 99 in Sarajevo, a few independent radio stations, Radio Zid in Sarajevo, Radio Kameleon in Tuzla, and a few independent newspapers and magazines but there are no Bosnia-wide media. We were told in the office of the High Representative in Sarajevo that they favour the establishment of an all-Bosnia TV station and that funding has been found for this project. However, they were not able to overcome the political objections from the governments of the two entities. Apparently, all they are willing to accept is a channel in which each party gets 5 minutes. An additional argument was that an all-Bosnia TV is not possible because NATO destroyed the communication structures in Republika Srbska. But can it really be beyond the capacity of the international community to rebuild a transmission cable between, say, Pale and Sarajevo or Tuzla and Banja Luka?

Another important legacy of the war is the economic situation. According to the World Bank, some 50% of the population in the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina is unemployed. Other estimates are much higher. The EU reports that only 10% of the population have jobs and, in Banja Luka, we were told that only 8% have jobs. What to do with demobilised soldiers, displaced persons, disabled persons and other war victims, is an immense problem, especially since humanitarian aid is due to be phased out in a few months. So far, almost nothing has been spent on reconstruction. Apart from one innovative project in Tuzla, aimed at supporting micro-enterprises so as to increase employment for the most vulnerable groups, what has been spent mostly focuses on infrastructure and is channelled through nationalist authorities. There is a desperate need to devote resources to human capital, education and the independent media if the situation is to be changed. There is also a risk that reconstruction aid can "buy" votes for the existing authorities. For example, a project for reconstructing houses in the separation zone will start in Kalesija near Tuzla. The SDA President in the Tuzla canton, who is responsible for the programme, also used to be the mayor of Kalesija. His Minister for Reconstruction comes from Gradanac which will also receive some of the reconstruction funds.

Above all, the legacy of the war is psychological. After the initial relief, people are slowly beginning to take in what the war has meant - the trauma of the last three and a half years. "We didn't have time to think about what was happening" said a friend in Tuzla "we concentrated on survival". "The lights went off in April 1992" said a left politician in Republika Srbska "When they came on again, everything was destroyed."

Whether by design or by default, the policy of the international community effectively favours the maintenance of the status quo by force. It seems evident that those responsible for the international involvement in Bosnia prefer stability to justice, realpolitik to human values. But it is a strategy which could ricochet. The recent Rome agreement in Mostar which effectively abandoned all hope of reuniting the city was followed by a march of refugees to retake their homes in West Mostar, led by the Mayor of East Mostar who had just resigned. The agreement has increased the risk that the Federation could collapse. And if Mostar is the flashpoint for Moslem-Croat conflict, then Brcko, which saw the bitterest fighting during the war because of its strategic position linking the two halves of Republika Srbska and providing access to Northern Bosnia, could well become the flashpoint for renewed Serb-Moslem conflict. The demarcation lines of Brcko still have not been settled and are due to come under international arbitration this summer. The central issue is the Posavina corridor.

The status quo option is actually a recipe for instability, creating a permanent Palestinian-type sore in the heart of the Balkans, providing the conditions for tension, sporadic conflict and terrorism for a long time to come. There is an alternative but it requires conscious effort. It means taking seriously internal security, conscious support for the non-nationalist alternative including media and education, as well as a genuine reconstruction effort. Effectively, the IFOR Commander is the military protector of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The High Representative ought to be a civil protector too, able to take the kind of actions that are needed to build a democratic alternative. For example, Brcko which will eventually be part off the separation zone should become an open city in the way that was originally intended in Mostar. Because, it will be demilitarised and because there is some interest among authorities on both sides, it need not face the same problems as Mostar. An initiative of this kind should be taken quickly to defuse the situation before the arbitration procedures and before the problem of refugees from Sarajevo becomes insurmountable.

Such an imaginative alternative approach seems, at present, unlikely. This is partly for institutional and bureaucratic reasons. Responsibilities have been divided up between the various "interlocking" institutions, each bureaucrat is anxious about his or her survival in the institutional nexus and all fear "mission creep". The dreaded phrase "not part of our mandate" still haunts Bosnia-Herzegovina. Noone seems to feel responsible for the tasks that fall within the cracks. But the institutional web also reflects some political priorities. The cost of IFOR is approximately $5 billion a year. This is equivalent to the amount that is supposed to be spent on reconstruction over five years and has not yet been appropriated. Many of the civil institutions complain that they simply do not have the funds to carry out their tasks. The way that spending has been allocated and the apparent lack of communication between the official institutions and the non-nationalist groups seems to suggest realpolitik and solutions imposed "from above" still dominate the mindsets of those who make the key decisions.

This article is based on a Helsinki Citizens Assembly mission to Sarajevo, Tuzla, Banja Luka, and Brcko.